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The usual caveat applies.
1 Introduction
... there is almost never a stable set of active programmes to evaluate. Coun-
tries are continuously chopping and changing the mix of programmes.
Martin and Grubb (2001, p. 21)
Over the past few years, active labor market policies (ALMP) have placed a greater
emphasis on job search assistance, monitoring and testing work availability, as well
as limited training to activate the unemployed in the short run (OECD, 2007).
There has been a greater focus on activating the unemployed to nd unsubsidized
jobs instead of placing the unemployed in traditional longterm training programs
or public employment schemes. Shortterm programs are replacing longer programs
in order to prevent long lockin eects.
Public sector sponsored training has traditionally been a main part of ALMP in
many countries including Germany; see the surveys in Fay (1996), Martin and
Grubb (2001), and Kluve (2010). Although there were many pessimistic assess-
ments regarding the usefulness of such programs, these surveys point out that small
scale training programs, which are well targeted to specic groups and which in-
volve a strong onthejob component, can show positive employment eects. Little
is known in the literature about the medium and longrun eects of activation
strategies which combine training, job search assistance, and monitoring.2 In Ger-
many, the focus on activation strategies is reected in the recent shift away from
traditional longer further training programs, typically lasting a couple of months up
to two years, to shortterm training programs (Trainingsmaÿnahmen, henceforth
denoted by `ST00'shortterm training in the 2000s) lasting at most twelve weeks.
2There are two recent notable exceptions for the US. Dyke et al. (2006) divide welfaretowork
programs in Missouri and North Carolina into three categories dened by their intensity: rst
only assessment, second job readiness or job search activities, and third more intensive training
(including for example basic education or vocational training). The study estimates the earnings
eects of these programs over a period of four years. Heinrich et al. (2009) study the employment
and earnings eects of participating in programs of dierent intensity as part of the Workforce
Investment Act in dierent US states. The results of both studies suggest that the employment or
earnings eects of shortterm programs involving assessment or counseling are positive but fairly
shortlived whereas more intensive training shows greater gains in the long run. Some features
of these US programs, like for example an assessment of the opportunities of the jobseeker,
are similar to the German shortterm training programs considered here. Important conceptual
dierences are, rst, that participants in shortterm training in Germany have to be unemployed
to be eligible, whereas this is not the case in the US. Second, participation in German programs
is often mandatory. In fact, often the reason for the assignment of shortterm training is to check
or monitor the willingness to work of a transfer recipient. In the US, jobseekers usually have
to ask for training. Third, the available studies for the US do not analyze explicitly the eect of
shortterm training on future participation in longterm training programs. Assessment of the
latter is a policy goal in Germany but not the US.
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In fact, ST00 have become the largest program in Germany in terms of the number
of participants with 1.07 Million individuals entering such programs in 2007 (Bun-
desagentur für Arbeit, 2007, pp. 54, 57). In contrast, only 356 thousand individuals
entered longer further training programs in 2007.3 Longer further training programs
used to be the largest programs in Germany but have been replaced to a large extent
by the much less costly ST00 programs. In light of the recent evidence that long
training programs mostly show positive longrun employment eects (Fitzenberger
et al., 2008; Lechner et al., 2011), one might be concerned that a focus on activa-
tion strategies comes at the expense of pushing the unemployed into unstable jobs
which do not result in permanently better employment prospects. There are dier-
ent types of ST00 programs. In this paper, we distinguish programs which focus on
skill provision and programs which focus on testing and monitoring search eort.
Between 1980 and 1992, shortterm training programs similar in nature to ST00 were
in place in West Germany (and since 1990 also in East Germany). These were the
`Programs According to Article 41a Employment Promotion Act' (Maÿnahmen nach
41a Arbeitsförderungsgesetz, henceforth denoted by `ST8092'shortterm training
between 1980 and 1992). Due to budgetary reasons these programs were abolished
in 1992. In 1998, shortterm training in the form of ST00 was reintroduced into the
Social Code III (Sozialgesetzbuch III ) that currently regulates labor market policy.
While activation and monitoring are major goals of ST00, the older ST8092 focus
solely on job search assistance, limited training, and guidance towards future par-
ticipation in longterm training programs. Furthermore, the ST8092 programs were
targeted to the lowskilled and hardtoplace unemployed. The common features
of the two programs are provision of shortterm training, assessment of the unem-
ployed (e.g. regarding future assignment to longer labor market programs), and job
search assistance.
There have been a number of studies estimating the eects of shortterm training
since 2000 (ST00) applying dierent program evaluation estimators (Hujer et al.,
2006; Wunsch and Lechner, 2008; Biewen et al., 2007; Stephan et al., 2006; Büttner,
2008; Osikominu, 2009) using rich administrative data and stateoftheart econo-
metric methods. We are not aware of any study which uses modern approaches to
estimate treatment eects for the older ST8092 programs. In the following, we sum-
marize the evidence for ST00 and other short training programs in West Germany.
Lechner et al. (2011) analyze shorter further training programs in the 1990s that
last longer than ST00 or ST8092 programs and provide more sizeable investments
3In 2000, there was a reverse ranking with 552 thousand individuals entering longer further
training programs and 477 thousand individuals entering ST00 (table 2).
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into occupational skills. This study nds that the cumulative longrun employment
eects of shorter training are higher than for longer training programs. Lechner
and Wunsch (2009) show that the eect of longer training programs diers over the
business cycle such that these programs show better partial equilibrium employment
eects when unemployment is high. This is both due to less pronounced negative
lockin eects in the shortrun and higher longrun positive program eects. This
suggests that the activation eect of these programs on the unemployed is stronger
in times of high unemployment. To our knowledge, no comparable evidence exists
for shortterm training with its strong focus on activation. Note that dierences in
lockin eects are likely to be of less relevance for shortterm training because of
its shorter duration.
Biewen et al. (2007) and Wunsch and Lechner (2008) show that for the early 2000s
ST00 tends to perform better than longer training programs regarding their em-
ployment eects in the rst two to three years after program start. Biewen et al.
(2007) nd some signicantly positive employment eects for ST00 in West Ger-
many, whereas Wunsch and Lechner (2008) nd no signicantly positive treatment
eects. Both studies use a matching approach relying on the conditional indepen-
dence assumption. Wunsch and Lechner (2008) use a static evaluation approach.4
They match participants and nonparticipants based on participation status during
the observed time period to estimate the eect of treatment versus notreatment.
The temporal alignment during the unemployment spell occurs by drawing random
program starts for the nonparticipants. For the German institutional setting, such
a static denition of the treatment and control groups likely leads to a downward bias
in the estimated treatment eect. If one denes those as treated who receive treat-
ment during the observed time period and those as untreated who do not receive
treatment during this time period, one eectively conditions on future outcomes.
Since participation is only possible as long as an individual remains unemployed,
unlucky jobseekers who did not manage to nd a job quickly are overrepresented
in the treatment group and lucky jobseekers who quickly found a job are overrep-
resented in the nontreatment group. This leads to a downward bias of the static
estimator (Fredriksson and Johansson, 2008). Biewen et al. (2007) argue that the
eect of treatment versus notreatment cannot be estimated in a dynamic setting
using matching and therefore focus on the eect of treatment versus waiting building
on the approach suggested by Sianesi (2004, 2008) in a similar context. We use the
same approach as Biewen et al. (2007) in this paper. This approach straties the
sample according to the dierent treatment starting dates observed. It then denes
treatment eects conditional on remaining unemployed until a given date and uses
4The same framework is also used in Lechner and Wunsch (2009) and Lechner et al. (2011).
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for matching all nonparticipants who are still unemployed at that date, irrespective
of whether they participate at a future point in time.
Hujer et al. (2006) and Osikominu (2009) use a multivariate continuoustime dura-
tion framework in the spirit of Abbring and van den Berg (2003) to estimate the
eects of ST00 on the hazard rates out of unemployment and out of subsequent
employment.5 The results of these studies are not directly comparable to studies
that apply, as we do, sequential matching techniques. First, the two approaches
estimate dierent treatment parameters. Sequential matching focuses on the eect
of receiving treatment at a given elapsed unemployment duration in the population
of survivors at the given date. The duration model framework, in contrast, proposes
a model for the joint selection into outcome states and treatments over time, and
therefore allows estimation of treatment eects that do not condition on survival
in unemployment. Furthermore, the identication strategies of the two approaches
dier. While matching techniques rely on a selection on observed variables strategy,
the duration framework allows in addition for selection based on unobserved vari-
ables that are separable from the observed components in the hazard rates. Hujer et
al. (2006) as well as Osikominu (2009) nd that ST00 have a positive eect on the
exit rate to work, thus reducing unemployment duration. Osikominu (2009) nds
in addition that ST00 tend to reduce the exit rate from employment back to un-
employment, but to a smaller degree than more comprehensive longterm training
schemes. Hujer et al. (2006) nd that lowskilled men tend to benet more from
ST00 than lowskilled women.
The studies reviewed so far do not distinguish between dierent types of ST00.
Stephan et al. (2006) consider participation in dierent versions of ST00 in the
second half of the year 2002. The study uses a matching estimator and nds dif-
fering results depending on the type of ST00. The monitoring and testing version
of ST00 does not show positive results, whereas the training versions show signi-
cantly positive or negative results depending upon whether the training takes place
in a rm. Stephan et al. (2006)  like Biewen et al. (2007)  estimate the eect
of training versus waiting. Their outcome variable is the probability of remaining
in registered unemployment whereas we consider as outcomes the monthly employ-
ment status, halfyearly earnings, and monthly enrolment in longterm training. As
the focus of their paper is to introduce a new targeting system of the labor agency
5Hujer et al. (2006) analyze the duration of unemployment only, while Osikominu (2009) also
considers the duration of subsequent employment spells. Hujer et al. (2006) only model the duration
until entry into shortterm training, while Osikominu (2009) models the competing risks of starting
a shortterm or longterm training program. Also, the observation period used by Osikominu is
longer.
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and to produce comparable results for very dierent active labor market programs,
their estimation approach does not focus on producing unbiased estimates for ST00
programs in particular. Büttner (2008) uses a very small experimental data set,
which comprises three dierent subsamples, i.e. parttime unemployed women, un-
employed who previously worked in manufacturing, and young unemployed aged 20
to 27, from one local employment oce in West Germany in 2005. The study uses
an experiment to investigate the eects of an ST00 program that involves monitor-
ing and testing (similar to the testing and monitoring variant in our paper) on the
outcome variables exit from unemployment and entry into employment. Because
of attrition and non-compliance after random assignment (among 189 unemployed
receiving an invitation only 77 actually participate), the study applies propensity
score matching to balance personal characteristics between treated and controls.
The focus of the study is on distinguishing the eects of the announcement of treat-
ment (`threat eect') from the eect of actual treatment. The study does not nd
any signicant eects, neither for the announcement of treatment nor for the eect
of actually participating. Most of the point estimates are close to zero.
The literature review reveals that most previous studies do not distinguish between
dierent types of ST00 programs and that estimates of the longrun eects of short
term training are missing. This paper estimates the eects of shortterm training
programs in West Germany both for the time period 1980 to 1992 (ST8092) and 2000
to 2003 (ST00) for the outcomes employment, earnings, and participation in long
term training programs. This paper is the rst to use stateoftheart estimators of
treatment eects for the shortterm training programs in the 1980s and early 1990s.
We investigate in particular whether there are lasting positive eects on employment
outcomes and whether participation in these programs leads to higher participation
in longterm training programs afterwards. We investigate whether treatment eects
of ST8092 vary over calendar time. Furthermore, we analyze participation in short
term training in the early 2000s in an analogous way in order to compare the results
for both periods. Because the ST8092 programs were not intended to test and
monitor the unemployed, we distinguish two versions of ST00, namely the training
variant, which focuses on skill provision (QST00) and the monitoring variant, which
focuses on testing and monitoring search eort (MST00). We argue that the ST8092
programs are comparable to the QST00 version of ST00.
Methodologically, this paper follows the approach of Sianesi (2004) and estimates
the eect of starting treatment after some given unemployment experience against
the alternative of not starting treatment at this given point in time, based on the
sample of individuals who are still unemployed at that given time. We use the same
5
methodological approach in all our subsamples in order to be able to compare the re-
sults for the 1980s, 1990s, and early 2000s. Most evaluation studies in the past used
a static approach to evaluate the eects of receiving treatment against the alterna-
tive of not receiving treatment during a xed observation window.6 In a dynamic
setting in which the jobseekers are continuously at risk of being assigned to a pro-
gram as long as they remain unemployed the timing of events becomes important;
see Abbring and van den Berg (2003), Fredriksson and Johansson (2008), and Sianesi
(2004, 2008). Static treatment evaluations attempt to estimate the eect of receiv-
ing treatment versus not receiving treatment. However, in a dynamic setting this
leads to biased treatment eects because the jobseekers with shorter unemployment
durations are less likely to be in the treatment group. Thus, the static approach
implicitly conditions on future outcomes (Fredriksson and Johansson, 2008). The
sequential matching approach suggested by Sianesi (2004) avoids this problem but
does not identify the eect of treatment versus notreatment; instead, it identies
the eect of treatment at a given point in time versus notreatment at that point
in time, which implies the possibility of receiving treatment at some later point in
time (i.e. the controls wait and search further in open unemployment).
Appropriate data for a longterm evaluation of public sector sponsored training pro-
grams were not available for a long time. This is the rst paper using administrative
data covering such a long time period, namely 18 years in the 1980s and 1990s and
four years in the early 2000s to study the mediumterm and, for the earlier time
period, also the longterm employment eects of shortterm training. The compari-
son between the earlier and the more recent time period is interesting because of the
similarities between the two programs. In addition to employment and earnings, we
also consider the eects on future participation in longer further training programs.
This is important because one stated goal of shortterm training in Germany is
to assess the unemployed's need to participate in longerterm training programs.
However, with an increasing focus on shortrun activation strategies this goal may
have declined in importance over time.
According to our results, shortterm training shows mostly persistently positive and
often signicant employment eects. The eects are particularly strong for those
participants who receive training during months seven to twelve of the unemploy-
ment spell. The eects for shortterm training starting during the second year of
the unemployment spell tend to be smaller.7 The monitoring variant MST00 shows
6Biewen et al. (2007) is an exception as well as Hujer et al. (2006) and Osikominu (2009) who
use a dierent dynamic approach than ours.
7Note that this result does not imply that moving the start of training for those who receive
training late in their unemployment spell to an earlier time period would necessarily increase their
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slightly smaller eects compared to the pure training variant QST00. The lockin
periods last longer for ST8092 compared to ST00 and the employment eects tend
to be smaller for the earlier time period compared to QST00 but not compared to
MST00. The earnings eects follow a similar pattern as the employment eects.
Shortterm training results in higher future participation in longer further training
programs and this eect is much stronger for ST8092 and MST00 than for QST00.
Note that our results only provide partial equilibrium estimates.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 discusses the institu-
tional aspects of shortterm training in Germany. Section 3 presents the data used.
Section 4 describes the methodological approach to estimate the treatment eects.
The empirical results are discussed in section 5. Section 6 concludes. The appendix
provides detailed empirical results. An online appendix with further detailed in-
formation about the data and further detailed results is published on the website of
the journal together with the online publication of this article.
2 Institutional Background
In Germany, training is traditionally a very important part of active labor market
policy that aims at permanently reintegrating unemployed individuals into the labor
market.8 Among the dierent types of training programs oered, longterm further
training programs with a duration of up to two years used to play the most important
role since their introduction in 1969. During the 1980s and since 1999, shortterm
training programs have been used on a large scale, too. Table 1 displays the entries
into dierent types of active labor market programs in West Germany in the period
1979 to 1992. It can be seen that entries into shortterm training rose steadily until
1987, remained at a lower level in 1988 and 1989 and peaked again in 1990. Table 2
shows the participation numbers in Germany as well as West Germany for the more
recent period since 1999. In recent years participation in shortterm training has
risen considerably. Since 2001, shortterm training has become the most important
type of training in terms of the number of participants.
 Insert tables 1 and 2 about here 
employment gain from training. The groups of participants at dierent points in time dier due
to the dynamic selection and it may be the case that a smaller impact of training for the very
longterm unemployed is due to the selection into longterm unemployment and not to the timing
of training.
8Other important policy instruments are for instance employment subsidies, job creation in the
public sector, and schemes to promote selfemployment.
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Modern shortterm training programs (ST00) have two main goals. First, they
are supposed to enhance reintegration of the participants into employment through
guidance and qualication. This may comprise training in job search skills through
activities such as jobapplication training, simulation of job interviews or general
counseling on job search methods. It may also involve the provision of specic skills
(like limited computer skills or some technical tasks) that are necessary to improve
the jobseeker's labor market prospects.9 The second aim of shortterm training
is to assess the jobseekers' labor market opportunities and their suitability for
dierent jobs but also their availability and willingness to work. This may entail
the preparation of detailed work plans to reintegrate the jobseeker into the labor
market which can include participation in a longterm training program.10 The
availability of the unemployed is checked by pledging him or her to attend the full
time training program. In our empirical analysis we therefore distinguish shortterm
training programs for which the objective of qualifying the jobseeker dominates
from programs that put more emphasis on testing the availability for work and
assessing the jobseekers' opportunities using the information on the program codes
in the data. Such a distinction can only be an approximation, as the same program
can serve both purposes, even for the same participant. However, this distinction is
also useful for the comparison with shortterm training in the period 1980 to 1992,
where testing work availability was not an (ocial) goal.
ST00 programs last between two and twelve weeks (with median duration around
four weeks). Therefore, they are relatively cheap compared to the longer further
training programs. In fact, a onemonth shortterm training course costs on average
e550 per participant, whereas participation costs for a further training course lasting
nine months amount to about e5850; see Biewen et al. (2007, table 1).
In the 1980s and 1990s, there existed shortterm training programs (ST8092) that
were very similar to those described above. The law governing active labor mar-
ket policy at that time, the Employment Promotion Act (Arbeitsförderungsgesetz),
included an article on `Programs to Improve the Employment Chances of the Unem-
ployed' (Maÿnahmen zur Verbesserung der Vermittlungsaussichten für Arbeitslose).
The number of this article in the Employment Promotion Act gave the programs
their name: `Programs According to Article 41a'. These programs where introduced
in 1979 after the German labor market conditions had worsened in the 1970s and
the number of longterm unemployed had risen considerably.
9For more details on the contents of shortterm training see Kurtz (2003).
10One element of the law called JobAQTIV Gesetz introduced in 2002 is to assess the jobseeker
soon after becoming unemployed. This may be done through a shortterm training program (Kurtz,
2003).
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ST8092 programs were particularly targeted at individuals with lower re
employment chances such as women, individuals without formal qualication
and the longterm unemployed. Hardtoplace and lowskilled individuals were
underrepresented in the existing longterm training programs. Shortterm train-
ing was intended to counsel jobseekers about their employment chances and the
possibilities of participating in longterm training programs on the one hand and
to teach limited skills helpful for either employment or participation in a longterm
training program on the other hand (Dobischat and Wassmann, 1981). Similar
to ST00, ST8092 programs mostly consisted of fulltime classroom training. The
curriculum covered e.g. job counseling, information on public sponsored further
training programs and on the general labor market situation, application and com-
munication training, visiting rms and exercises with the intention of boosting the
participants' selfcondence. The maximum length was in general six weeks and
there was no exam at the end of the course (Schneider, 1981).
At the end of 1992, ST8092 programs were abolished in order to reduce the costs
of active labor market policy in a time of narrow budgets. Shortterm training
programs were reintroduced in 1997 (in the rst years with a small number of par-
ticipants only) and gained importance from 1999 onwards (Kurtz, 2003).11
When becoming unemployed individuals have to personally register at the local
labor oce. This involves a rst counseling interview with the caseworker. Further
interviews may follow from time to time. Based on these interviews in general the
caseworker decides whether to assign an unemployed person to a program. Besides
being registered as unemployed or as a jobseeker at risk of becoming unemployed,
candidates for shortterm training do not have to full any additional eligibility
criteria. Depending on regional and local circumstances, caseworkers exercise a
considerable amount of discretion when allocating the unemployed to the dierent
programs. Suitable programs are chosen from a pool of public and private providers.
Jobseekers have no legal right to claim program participation; rather, it is up to
the caseworker to decide whether training is considered necessary and in addition
there are often supply constraints for specic programs. Usually a caseworker will
at least discuss the ideas and desires of the jobseeker with him or her. But in
the end, the caseworker may, on the one hand, refuse to assign a program or, on
the other hand, assign a program against the wishes of the jobseeker. The latter
11From 1993 to 1997, there existed no public sponsored shortterm training programs, but in
some cases jobseekers were allowed to participate in externally oered short qualication programs
while receiving transfer payments. In principle, participants had to cover program costs themselves.
But in many cases they received an allowance from the labor agency to cover at least part of the
program costs (Kurtz, 2003).
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applies in particular for MST00 programs. If the jobseeker refuses to attend the
assigned program, he or she runs the risk of being sanctioned by losing his or her
transfer payments for some weeks.
The employment oce pays all direct training costs for shortterm training pro-
grams. In addition, ST00 participants continue to receive unemployment benets
or meanstested unemployment assistance, if they are eligible for such transfer pay-
ments. Thus, in the early 2000s, there exist no pure nancial incentives for unem-
ployed individuals to participate in ST00, in contrast to the situation in Germany
before 1998. In the 1980s, shortterm training was treated in the same way as
longer further training programs. This means that participants who fullled certain
eligibility criteria (mainly 720 days of employment subject to social security con-
tributions within the last three years) received an income maintenance allowance
which was more generous than the usual unemployment compensation. Those who
where not eligible to receive income maintenance allowance continued to receive the
meanstested unemployment assistance (Bender et al., 2005).
3 Data
3.1 Administrative Data Sets Used
This study uses large administrative data sets for both time periods under investiga-
tion. For the 2000s, the empirical analysis is based on the socalled Integrated Em-
ployment Biographies Sample (IEBS), a data set which has recently been made avail-
able by the Federal Employment Oce of Germany.12 The IEBS consists of a 2.2%
random sample of individual data drawn from the universe of data records collected
in four dierent administrative processes: the Employment History (Beschäftigten
Historik), the Benet Recipient History (LeistungsempfängerHistorik), the Data on
Job Search Originating from the Applicants Pool Database (Bewerberangebot), and
the ParticipantsinMeasures Data (MaÿnahmeTeilnehmerGesamtdatenbank).13
The Employment History is based on social insurance register data comprising em-
ployment information for employees subject to contributions to the public social
12For detailed information on the IEBS see Hummel et al. (2005) and Bender, Biewen et
al. (2005). Information in English can be found in Jacobebbinghaus and Seth (2007) or on
the website of the Research Data Center (FDZ) of the German Federal Employment Oce
(http://fdz.iab.de/en.aspx).
13The data used here has been supplemented with some additional information that are not
available in the standard version.
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security system. It covers the time period from 1990 to 2004. The main feature of
these data is detailed daily information on the employment of each recorded individ-
ual. We use this information to account for the labor market history of individuals
as well as to measure employment and earnings outcomes. For each employment
spell, in addition to start and end dates, data from the Employment History con-
tains information on personal as well as job and rm characteristics such as the
wage, industry, and occupation.
The Benet Recipient History, the second data source, includes daily spells of un-
employment benet, unemployment assistance and income maintenance allowance
payments individuals received between January 1990 and June 2005.14 The Benet
Recipient History provides information on the periods in which individuals were out
of employment and therefore not covered by the Employment History. Moreover,
we use additional information contained in the Benet Recipients History involving
sanctions and periods of exclusion from benet receipt that may serve as indicators
of a lack of motivation. Based on the information in the Employment and Benet
Recipient Histories we calculate the individual entitlement periods to unemployment
benets.15
The third data source included in the IEBS is the socalled Data on Job Search
Originating from the Applicants Pool Database, which contains rich information
on individuals searching for jobs covering the period January 2000 to June 2005.
The spells include detailed information concerning job search and personal charac-
teristics, in particular on educational qualications, nationality, and marital status.
They also provide information on whether the applicant wishes to change occupa-
tion, how many job proposals he or she already got, and about health problems
that might inuence employment chances. Finally, the data on applicants include
regional and local identiers, which we use to link regional and local information,
for example unemployment rates at the district level.
The ParticipantsinMeasures Data, the fourth data source, contains detailed infor-
mation on participation in public sector sponsored labor market programs covering
the period January 2000 to June 2005. The data consist of spells indicating the
start and end dates at a daily level, the type of the program as well as additional
14Until the end of 2003, unemployed individuals in Germany (who had worked in a job subject
to social security taxation before) received unemployment benets for the length of the benet
entitlement period, which depends upon the length of prior employment. Afterwards, they received
the meanstested unemployment assistance if eligible. The income maintenance allowance is a
transfer payment participants of most types of training programs (but not participants of ST00)
usually received instead of unemployment benets to cover their living costs while in training.
15For this purpose we rely on Plaÿmann (2002) who summarizes the regulations regarding enti-
tlements to unemployment benets.
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information. The Data Base of Program Participants allows us not only to identify
participation in shortterm training, but also in other programs such as employ-
ment subsidies. This is useful, as it enables us to distinguish between regular and
subsidized employment when evaluating employment and earnings outcomes.
For the earlier time period covering the 1980s and 1990s, we use administrative indi-
vidual data from three dierent sources. These data were assembled for the purpose
of evaluating public sector sponsored training programs, see Bender, Bergemann et
al. (2005) for a detailed description. The rst data source is the IAB Employment
Subsample (IAB Beschäftigtenstichprobe, IABS) of the Institute for Employment
Research (IAB), see Bender et al. (2000) and Bender, Bergemann et al. (2005, chap-
ter 2.1). The IABS is a 1% random sample of all employment records liable to social
insurance contributions in the period 19751997. It also contains information on pe-
riods with transfer payments from the unemployment insurance system. The second
data source is the Benet Payment Register (Leistungsempfängerdatei, LED) of the
Federal Employment Oce; see Bender, Bergemann et al. (2005, chapter 2.2). These
data consist of spells of transfer payments granted to the unemployed and to pro-
gram participants in the period 19751997. They include very detailed information
about income maintenance payments, which allows identication of participation in
dierent training programs, including the ST8092 programs investigated here. These
benet data contain more detailed information than the benet data available in the
IABS. The two data sources were merged to create the socalled IABSLED data
set, see Bender, Bergemann et al. (2005) for details. Based on the IABSLED data
we calculate the individual entitlement periods to unemployment benets.
As a third data source, we use an administrative survey on training participation,
the so called FuUdata, see Bender, Bergemann et al. (2005, chapter 2.3). The
Federal Employment Oce collected these data for all participants in further train-
ing, retraining, and other training programs for internal monitoring and statistical
purposes. For every participant, the FuUdata contain detailed information about
the program and the participant.
The FuUdata were merged with the combined IABSLED data by social insurance
number and additional covariates. Numerous corrections were implemented in order
to improve the quality of the data, see Bender, Bergemann et al. (2005, chapters 34)
and Fitzenberger et al. (2008) for details. While the IABS provides information on
personal characteristics and employment histories, the combination of the transfer
payment data and the training participation data is used to identify participation
in dierent types of training programs.
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3.2 Sample Selection
In this study, we analyze inow samples into unemployment consisting of individuals
living in West Germany who became unemployed after having been continuously em-
ployed for at least three months. The beginning of an unemployment spell is dened
as the transition from regular employment (excluding subsidized employment and
employment of very few hours with earnings below the lower social security thresh-
old) to nonemployment and subsequently being in contact with the employment
oce (not necessarily immediately), either through benet receipt, program partic-
ipation, or a job search spell.16 This way, we focus on individuals closely attached
to the labor market, which allows us to construct a control group that exhibits a
similar employment history as the treated individuals. Furthermore, the beginning
of unemployment denes a natural time scale to align treated and nontreated indi-
viduals. In order to exclude individuals in formal education or vocational training
and individuals eligible for early retirement schemes, we only consider persons aged
between 25 and 53 years at the beginning of their unemployment spell. Our evalu-
ation focuses on participation in shortterm training as the rst training program
that is attended in the course of an unemployment spell. Later participation in
other active labor market programs is regarded as an outcome.
For the evaluation of ST00, we focus on an inow sample into unemployment between
the beginning of January 2000 and the end of June 2001. The analysis of ST8092 is
based on an inow sample into unemployment from January 1980 to January 1991.17
We consider participation in shortterm training within the rst two years of an
unemployment spell. Thus, we evaluate ST8092 programs starting from January
1980 until their abolition in December 1992 and ST00 programs starting between
January 2000 and June 2003. For the earlier time period, the data allow us to
follow all individuals until the end of 1997. Therefore, we are able to estimate long
term eects of the ST8092 programs for all participants in our data. We follow the
individuals in the more recent sample until the end of 2004.
In the sample covering the early 2000s, we distinguish two types of shortterm
training programs: the rst one puts more emphasis on training the jobseeker
(QST00), while the second one focuses on monitoring and testing the availability
for work (MST00). We argue that the QST00 variant of ST00 is more similar to the
16In the IEBS we can identify employment subsidized by the labor agency and thus exclude this
from our denition of regular employment. This is unfortunately not possible for the 1980s and
1990s.
17This implies that the same individual may appear more than once in our evaluation sample.
We take account of multiple inclusions of the same individual in the sample when calculating the
standard errors.
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ST8092 programs.
Figures 4 and 5 in the online appendix show the distribution of starting dates, for
both ST8092 and ST00. It turns out that program starts occur earlier during the
unemployment spell for ST00 compared to ST8092. The distribution for ST8092 is
fairly at during the rst year and falls slowly over the second year. Note that a
sizeable share of program starts occurs in the second year  and some even after
two years. For our comparison of ST00 and ST8092, we choose the same time
windows distinguishing between treatment starting during months 0 to 6 of the
unemployment spell (stratum 1), treatment starting during months 7 to 12 (stratum
2), and treatment starting during months 13 to 24 (stratum 3). The number of
participants and the size of the control group for each specication are depicted in
table 3. Our choice of strata allows for a reasonable number of participants in each
stratum for ST8092, MST00, and QST00 (the smallest involving 126 participants).
 Insert table 3 about here 
When choosing the number and width of the temporal strata there exists a tradeo
between bias (by smoothing over starting dates within a stratum and not analyzing
the dynamic assignment process within a stratum) and sample size. While there
are generally many comparison observations, the number of treated observations is
a constraining factor, especially for ST8092. Because of a low unconditional par-
ticipation rate in ST8092, the participant sample sizes are rather small. Therefore,
we pool over the years 19801992 in order to obtain sizeable treatment samples in
the three unemployment strata. This approach results in a large overall group of
nonparticipants considered in the analysis.18 We apply kernel matching techniques
for treatment eects estimation, which allows us  in contrast to nearest neighbor
matching  to make use of the large control group sample sizes when we estimate the
counterfactual outcomes (see the next section for further details). Small treatment
group sizes translate into correspondingly larger standard errors and thus insigni-
cant treatment eects. Put dierently, only suciently strong positive or negative
eects will prove signicant and in such cases the results are informative. We prefer
our approach over parametric methods that may lead to more precisely estimated
eects, but may possibly be biased because of unjustied functional form assump-
tions.
We consider three outcome variables: monthly employment status, monthly par-
ticipation rate in a longerterm training program later in the unemployment spell,
18In some cases, the control samples are so large, that we can only use a random subsample.
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and earnings over six months. In addition, we also estimate the average treatment
eect for employment over a longer time period after treatment start, a parameter
which may be more precisely estimated than monthly eects. The propensity scores
and the treatment eects are estimated separately for the dierent program types,
strata, and for both men and women.
4 Evaluation Approach
Our goal is to analyze the eect of shortterm training programs on three outcome
variables, namely the individual monthly employment dummy, earnings within a
halfyear interval, and an individual monthly participation dummy in a longer
term training program.19 The treatment we evaluate is participating in a shortterm
training program as a rst training program over the course of an unemployment
spell against the alternative of not participating in a shortterm training program
as a rst training program. This alternative includes the case of participating in
a longterm training program as rst training program or noparticipation in any
training program.20 We estimate the average treatment eect on the treated (ATT)
of shortterm training as rst treatment against this alternative. Extending the
static treatment approach to a dynamic setting, we follow Sianesi (2004) and apply
the standard static treatment approach recursively depending on the elapsed un-
employment duration. The implementation builds upon the approach developed in
Fitzenberger and Speckesser (2007), Biewen et al. (2007), and Fitzenberger et al.
(2008).
Our empirical analysis is based upon the potentialoutcomeapproach to causality,
see Roy (1951), Rubin (1974), and the survey of Heckman et al. (1999). Let the
two potential outcomes be fY 0; Y 1g, where Y 1 represents the outcome associated
with participation in a shortterm training program and Y 0 is the outcome when
the individual does not participate in a shortterm training program. For each
19Individual participation is measured as a dummy variable equal to one when the individual
participates in a longerterm training program in the respective month, irrespective of whether he
or she is still in the same unemployment spell or has already experienced transitions in and out of
employment.
20For the more recent data (ST00), the alternative also includes participation in other active
labor market programs besides longterm training. But for the older data (ST8092), we cannot
observe other programs besides training. We cannot distinguish between subsidized employment
and regular employment in the older data. We conduct a sensitivity analysis to explore to what
extent dierences in the information considered aect our estimated treatment eects of ST00.
The dierences are negligible; see the discussion in section 5 and gures 9 and 10 in the online
appendix.
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individual, only one of the two potential outcomes is observed and the other outcome
is counterfactual. We focus on the average treatment eect on the treated (ATT)
of participating in a shortterm training program against nonparticipation in a
shortterm training program at some given elapsed unemployment duration (i.e.
treatment versus waiting).
Fredriksson and Johansson (2008) argue that a static evaluation approach, which
assigns unemployed individuals to a treatment group and a nontreatment group
based on the treatment information observed in the data within a xed time win-
dow, yields biased treatment eects. This is because the denition of the control
group conditions on future outcomes or future treatment. Sianesi (2004) argues that
all unemployed individuals are potential future participants in active labor market
programs, a view which is particularly plausible for countries with comprehensive
systems of active labor market policies (like Sweden or Germany). In Germany,
active labor market programs are implemented at a fairly large scale in interna-
tional comparison. While unemployed, jobseekers are continuously at risk of being
assigned to an active labor market program. This discussion implies that a purely
static evaluation of the dierent training programs is not warranted. Following
Sianesi (2004, 2008), we analyze the eects of the rst participation in a short
term training program during the unemployment spell considered conditional on the
starting date of the treatment, relative to the start of the unemployment spell.
We analyze treatment eects conditional on elapsed unemployment at program start.
We evaluate the eect of participating in shortterm training as the rst treatment
during the unemployment spell considered. The ATT parameter for treatment in
month u of the unemployment spell is given by
(1) (u; ) = E(Y 1(u; )jTu = 1; U  u 1; T1 = ::: = Tu 1 = 0)
 E(Y 0(~u; )jTu = 1; u  ~u  u; U  u 1; T1 = ::: = Tu 1 = 0) ;
where u denotes the month of unemployment when the treatment starts, U the
completed duration of unemployment, and Tu is a dummy variable indicating the
start of treatment.  = 0; 1; 2; : : : counts the elapsed time since the beginning of
treatment. Y 1(u; ) is the period  potential outcome associated with treatment
in period u. Y 0(~u; ) denotes the potential outcome in the nontreatment case,
where ~u indicates nonparticipation between month u and u (u is the end of the
stratum of elapsed unemployment considered).21 The potential outcomes condition
21The requirement of nonparticipation until the end of the stratum does not exclude the pos-
sibility of exiting unemployment between period u and period u. The control group comprises all
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upon remaining unemployed at least until month u, i.e. U  u 1, and not receiving
treatment before month u, i.e. T1 = ::: = Tu 1 = 0. Nonparticipation during the
current stratum involves the possibility of treatment in a later stratum, which implies
that, after the end of the current stratum, Y 0(~u; ) includes potential outcomes
for treatments at later points in time. Our treatment parameter (1) mirrors the
decision problem of the caseworker and the unemployed who recurrently during the
unemployment spell decide whether to start a shortterm training program now or
to postpone participation to the future. The treatment eect we actually estimate
is the average within a stratum
() =
X
u
gu(u; ) ;
where the average is taken with respect to the distribution gu of starting dates u
within the stratum.
We evaluate the eects of treatment assuming the following dynamic version of the
conditional mean independence assumption (DCIA)
(2) E(Y 0(~u; )jTu = 1; u  ~u  u; U  u 1; T1 = ::: = Tu 1 = 0; X)
= E(Y 0(~u; )jT~u = 0; u  ~u  u; U  u 1; T1 = ::: = Tu 1 = 0; X) ;
where X are observed characteristics that are timeinvariant within an unemploy-
ment stratum. We eectively assume that conditional on X, and conditional on
remaining unemployed and not receiving treatment at least until period u 1, in-
dividuals who receive treatment in period u, Tu = 1, are comparable in their non
participation outcome to individuals who do not receive treatment during the stra-
tum considered, T~u = 0; u  ~u  u.
In our study, we apply propensity score matching building on Rosenbaum and Ru-
bin's (1983) result on the balancing property of the propensity score in the case of
a binary treatment. To account for the dynamic treatment assignment, we estimate
the probability of treatment given that unemployment lasts long enough to make an
individual `eligible'. For treatment starting during months 1 to 6 (stratum 1), we
take the total inow sample of unemployed, and estimate a probit model for treat-
ment during stratum 1. The nonparticipation group includes those unemployed
who either never participate in the treatment or who start a treatment after month
individuals whose unemployment spell lasts at least u 1 periods and not more than u periods and
who do not participate in any program during the stratum considered. Some of them may exit to
employment before the end of the stratum.
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6. For treatment during strata 2 (months 7 to 12) and 3 (months 13 to 24), the ba-
sic sample consists of those unemployed who are still unemployed in the last month
of the previous stratum. Implicitly, we assume that the actual beginning of treat-
ment within a stratum is random conditional on X. Many unemployment spells in
Germany are often quite long relative to other countries like the US. This makes
our assumption not seem unreasonable in combination with the fact that available
training programs often only start at xed calendar dates. Note that we only use
nonparticipants to estimate the treatment eect who are unemployed in the month
before treatment start, see below.
We implement a stratied local linear matching approach by imposing that the
matching partners for a treated individual are still unemployed in the month be-
fore treatment starts, i.e. we exactly align treated and nontreated individuals by
elapsed unemployment duration in months. In addition, we exactly align treated
and controls by the calendar month in which the unemployment spell began. The
expected counterfactual outcome for nonparticipation is obtained by means of a
local linear regression on the propensity score. We use a crossvalidation procedure
to obtain the bandwidth minimizing the squared prediction error for the average of
the nonparticipation outcome for the nearest neighbors of the treated individuals
(see Bergemann et al., 2009; Galdo et al., 2008).22 An estimate for the variance
of the estimated treatment eects is obtained through bootstrapping based on 250
resamples. We resample individuals. This way, we take account of the sampling
variability in the estimated propensity score and we obtain standard errors which
are clustered at the individual level.
As a balancing test (see Lee, 2012, for a recent critical assessment of balancing tests),
we use the regression test suggested in Smith and Todd (2005) to investigate whether
the covariates are balanced suciently by matching on the estimated propensity
score.23 For this purpose, each regressor in a given propensity score specication is
regressed on a exible polynomial of the predicted propensity score and interactions
of this polynomial with the treatment dummy. We then determine the number
of covariates in each specication for which the balancing test passes, i.e. the null
22The method used here is an extension of the crossvalidation procedure suggested in Berge-
mann et al. (2009). Galdo et al. (2008) dene and implement various weighted crossvalidation
approaches that consider the location of the treated units in the selection of the smoothing param-
eters. An extensive Monte Carlo study shows eciency gains from all methods that take account
of the location of the treated units. Galdo et al. also provide a recent summary of the literature.
23Lee (2012) performs a Monte Carlo study of dierent balancing tests. Permutation versions of
various parametric tests, which are similar to a bootstrap, tend to perform best. The regression
test of Smith and Todd (2005) seems to reject too often. In total, the size of this test is much
larger than the nominal size of the single tests conducted for each of the regressors in the propensity
score.
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hypothesis that the polynomial of the propensity score interacted with the treatment
dummy equals zero is not rejected. Furthermore, we investigate whether treated
and matched nontreated individuals dier signicantly in their outcomes before the
beginning of the unemployment spell. We estimate these dierences in the same
way as the treatment eects after the beginning of the program. By construction,
treated individuals and their matched counterparts exhibit the same unemployment
duration until the beginning of treatment.
We also investigate the heterogeneity of the ATT with respect to calender time. For
all treated individuals in the ST8092 sample, we calculate the cumulated individual
treatment eects by summing the individual monthly eects over the months of
training participation as well as the months after completion of training. We then
run a linear regression of these cumulated individual eects on dummy variables for
the dierent calendar years. This way we can assess whether program eects vary
by the macroeconomic situation.
We conclude this section with an exposition of why identication based on the DCIA
(2) is a credible strategy in our application. In our institutional context, the partic-
ipation probability depends upon the variables that also determine reemployment
prospects. Consequently, all individuals are considered as matching partners who
left employment at the same calendar date as the treated individuals (i.e. we require
that unemployment started in the same calendar month) and who have experienced
the same elapsed unemployment duration up to the considered program starting
date. Furthermore, we consider a rich set of individual characteristics and detailed
information on previous employment experiences in the propensity score estima-
tion. E.g., we consider information on schooling and vocational education, region
of residence, occupation, industry as well as the remaining period of entitlement to
unemployment benets. We use detailed information on past employment and un-
employment spells to proxy for `soft factors' that may inuence participation such as
the ability or motivation of the unemployed.24 Finally, as participation in training
occurred at a fairly large scale in Germany, assignment was not very targeted and
rather driven by the regional supply of programs. Moreover, caseworkers had little
guidance on `what works for whom'. Supporting our point of view, Schneider et al.
(2006) suggest that, until the end of 2002, training assignment was strongly driven
24Caliendo et al. (2004) investigate the employment eects of job creation schemes in 1999/2000
in Germany based on an administrative data set similar to ours. They were able to combine the
administrative data with survey data containing direct information on the motivation of partici-
pants that is not available in the administrative data. They nd that controlling in addition for
the motivational variables from the survey does not result in notable dierences in the estimated
program eects compared to using only the administrative data. This evidence also supports our
point of view.
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by the supply of available courses.
5 Empirical Results
5.1 Estimation of the Propensity Scores
We t the propensity scores separately for each of the 18 groups dened by program
type (ST8092, MST00, QST00), gender, and stratum (program start in months 0 to
6, 7 to 12, or 13 to 24 of the unemployment spell). In each case, we run an extensive
specication search. The nal specication was chosen based on consideration of
which variables may (according to institutional and economic knowledge) drive the
selection into programs, based on the statistical signicance of the variables included,
and based on the balancing tests described above.25 The nal specications include
15 to 31 covariates. The Smith and Todd (2005) balancing test is passed in almost
all cases at a 1% signicance level, except for one specication where we reject the
null hypothesis for one regressor when using the quartic of the propensity score
(tables 6 and 9 in the additional online appendix). Regarding the 5% level we still
pass 895 of 928 tests (both cubic and quartic regressions counted).26
A closer look at the estimation results for the propensity scores reveals that the
following information is particularly relevant: region, age, schooling degree, occu-
pational qualication, family status, children, foreign or German nationality, time
spent in dierent labor market states during the last three years (before the unem-
ployment spell), remaining claim on unemployment benets, industry of last em-
ployment, last occupation, last wage, reason for the end of last employment, year
or quarter the person became unemployed in, health status, past health problems,
information on program dropout during the last three years, (benet) sanctions dur-
ing the last three years, participation in a program supporting rehabilitation and
social integration, indication of lack of motivation during the last three years.
The variables occupation, reason for the end of last employment, health status,
past health problems, penalties and benet sanctions during the last three years,
participation in a program with a social work component, indication of lack of
motivation within the last three years, child younger than 10 years, and classication
25Detailed estimation results are available in tables 5 and 8 in the additional online appendix.
26Monte Carlo evidence in Lee (2012) suggests that the Smith and Todd (2005) balancing test
rejects too often, see footnote 23. Therefore, we think that the covariates of treated and matched
controls are well matched.
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of districts according to local labor market conditions are not available for the older
data. We suspect that we capture the information implicitly by using detailed
variables on the individual's labor market history. As a check, we also conduct a
sensitivity analysis for the estimation of employment eects by dropping from the
more recent data those variables not available in the older data. We summarize the
results of this test in the next section.
In the following, we discuss those variables which are less standard: by using vari-
ables which count the days spent in dierent labor market states (employment, re-
ceipt of unemployment benet or unemployment assistance, participation in training
or just any contact with the labor agency) during the last three years before the
start of the unemployment period in focus (or alternatively dummies if a particular
labor market status occurred within the last three years), we account for the fact
that some jobseekers experienced more or less time in unemployment before, while
others have been continuously employed during the last three years. The reason
for the end of the last employment is captured using dummy variables indicating
whether it was a displacement, the end of a xedterm contract or a voluntary quit.
This variable may capture aspects of the individual's employment history beyond
counting days in employment. For example, if the jobseeker held a xedterm
contract before, he may have been more likely to already look for a new job while
in employment. The remaining claim on unemployment benets is calculated by
ourselves accounting for changing rules and measured in days. The remaining time
a jobseeker may claim benets is supposed to inuence his or her job search be-
havior and may also inuence the caseworker's decision to assign a program. If a
person did not complete a scheduled program within the last three years before the
start of the current unemployment period, the caseworker may be more likely to
use an ST00 program to test his or her willingness to cooperate. This is also the
reason for including a dummy if the individual had been given a sanction before. In
addition to being potentially important for the selection into programs, these pieces
of information are likely to be relevant for the individual's job search behavior. The
dummies indicating whether the jobseeker has participated in a program with a
social work component in the past and whether there is any indication in the data
for lack of motivation (like repeated absence on the day of a scheduled interview)
reect potential problems. These variables may be relevant for the decision of the
caseworker to assign an ST00 program.
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5.2 Estimated Treatment Eects
The evaluation results for the employment eect of participating in shortterm train-
ing as the rst training program vs. waiting are shown in gures 1 to 3. Each graph
displays the average treatment eect on the treated (ATT), i.e. the dierence be-
tween the actual and the counterfactual employment outcome averaged over those
individuals who participate in the program under consideration. More precisely, we
compare the actual employment outcome of the treated to the employment outcome
these individuals would have had, had they not taken part in shortterm training as
a rst training program in the respective time window of their unemployment spell.
We distinguish between programs starting in three dierent time windows (strata)
of elapsed unemployment: 0 to 6 months (stratum 1), 7 to 12 months (stratum 2),
and 13 to 24 months (stratum 3). We evaluate treatment eects at dierent points
in time. On the time axis in our graphs, positive values denote months since the
program start, while negative values represent preunemployment months. We omit
the period between the start of unemployment and the start of the program where
both the control and treatment groups are unemployed. The dashed lines around the
estimated ATT are bootstrapped 95 percent pointwise condence bands. Treatment
eects for a particular month are statistically signicant if zero is not contained in
the condence band.
 Insert gure 1 about here 
Figure 1 shows the estimated treatment eects for the shortterm training programs
in the early 2000s with a strong focus on qualication (QST00). The results for men
are given in the left column, while those for women are shown in the right column.
During the program and in the period immediately following the end of the program,
participants typically have a lower monthly employment probability than they would
have had if they had not participated in the program. This is the socalled lockin
eect. Figure 1 suggests relatively short (1 to 4 months) and not very pronounced
lockin eects. These lockin eects are a bit deeper for stratum 1 (about 7 per-
centage points) than for the later strata (2 to 4 percentage points). After the short
lockin period, the dierence between actual and counterfactual employment out-
comes of participants turns positive. We nd signicantly positive eects for men
in the second and third strata (i.e. those men who have been unemployed for at
least half a year before entering a program) and for women in the rst and second
strata, but not in the third stratum. However, the point estimates for the latter
are positive after six months. The largest employment eects occur between month
12 and month 18. In the four groups with signicant eects, the size of the eects
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reaches 9 to 17 percentage points. After 18 months, the eects tend to decline a
little, but positive ATTs of 7 to 12 percentage points persist until the end of the
observation period (18 to 36 months after program start depending on the stratum).
These long lasting eects are quite remarkable given that the programs last only a
few weeks. First, as we do not exclude participants who attend a second training
program after shortterm training, but regard the second program as an outcome, it
could well be that the longterm eects are to some degree due to longterm training
programs which have been started as a result of the shortterm training program.
This would imply that shortterm training serves as a bridge into more intensive
training programs and this combination eventually leads to positive employment
eects. Second, if a high share of those who do not participate in the stratum
considered take longterm training later, this may also lead to positive treatment
eects for the participants for the time the (former) non-participants are locked into
programs. But as our results on future participation suggest that participating in
longterm training is more frequent for participants in shortterm training (see the
discussion of gures 7 to 9 below), and as lockin eects of shortterm training are
short the former argument seems to dominate.
 Insert gure 2 about here 
Figure 2 presents the corresponding results for the shortterm training programs in
the early 2000s we classied as having a strong focus on testing the availability and
willingness to work as well as the skills of jobseekers (MST00). The graphs suggest
that, while the point estimates of the monthly average treatment eects are mostly
positive, they generally fail to be clearly signicant. The only exception are women
who receive treatment in months 7 to 12 (stratum 2) of their unemployment spell.
After a small and very short lockin eect, we rst observe a small and insignicant
positive eect. Rising steadily over more than two years, it turns signicant after
9 months and eventually reaches 16 percentage points. This picture ts into the
scenario that part of the participants attend a second program as a result of the
MST00 program and this combination of programs eventually may lead to positive
employment eects. The trend of the treatment eect is similar for men and women
in stratum 1, but in these cases the level is much lower and the eect is insignicant.
The lockin eects follow a similar pattern for MST00 as for QST00.
In sum, participants of MST00 seem to have beneted less from their program
than participants of QST00 from the program they were assigned to. This does
not necessarily imply that participants in MST00 would benet from participating
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in QST00.27 We have no information if the program costs per day dier between
MST00 and QST00, but as both types of ST00 usually consist of teaching a medium
size group in classrooms, per day costs are likely to be similar. The average direct
cost for a month of ST00 was about e550 in the years 2000 to 2004 (Osikominu,
2009). But the median length of QST00 is 40 days in our sample, while the median
length of MST00 is only 19 days. So if per day costs were the same between these two
program types and equally distributed over the length, the median length MST00
program would cost e343 and the median length QST00 program would cost e721.
Thus, QST00 produces higher gains but is also more than twice as expensive as
MST00.
 Insert gure 3 about here 
Results for shortterm programs in the period 19801992 (ST8092) are given in
gure 3. The estimated monthly average treatment eects are positive after an
initial lockin eect. Remarkably, the lockin period is typically longer for ST8092
than for ST00. Also, the monthly ATTs of ST8092 are mostly smaller than those of
QST00 and statistically insignicant. Only for women unemployed for more than
one year (stratum 3) do the results show signicantly positive treatment eects of
7 to 10 percentage points between month 6 and month 20 after program start. For
the other groups the eects are  although for the time after the lockin period
always positive  insignicant. Interestingly, for most groups the employment eect
increases between month 18 and month 26 after treatment start. As discussed
before, this is likely due to participation in another training program as a result
of participation in shortterm training. In sum, ST8092 programs seem to be less
successful in bringing people back to employment compared to ST00, in particular
QST00. However, ST8092 were explicitly targeted to hardtoplace individuals.
One may wonder whether we miss an important part of the selection eects in the
older data because we only have a reduced set of variables available for matching
compared to the data available for ST00. As a sensitivity check for the employment
eects, we redid the analysis for QST00 and MST00, this time not considering
in the more recent data the information not available in the older data.28 We
reestimated the propensity scores based on a restricted set of covariates that is
also available in the older data. In addition, we redened the outcome dummy
27If treatment eects dier by the characteristics of the unemployed, a proper comparison of
the eect of one program against another would require balancing the characteristics in the two
treatment groups, see e.g. in Fitzenberger et al. (2008) or Biewen et al. (2007). Such a pairwise
analysis would have been beyond the scope of this paper.
28We are grateful to Je Smith for this suggestion.
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for employment analogously to the older data set. In particular, participants in
subsidized employment schemes are now counted as regularly employed. We use the
same bandwidths as for the benchmark estimates reported in gures 1 to 3. The
dierences in the estimated treatment eects are negligible, see gures 9 to 10 in
the online appendix. This supports our presumption that the variables used for
the older data are sucient for controlling for the selectivity of participants.
 Insert tables 4 and 5 about here 
Table 4 shows averages of the monthly ATTs from month six after program start
until the end of the observation period as a way of condensing employment eects
after the end of the lockin period. In four cases for QST00 and two cases for
MST00, the gures reported in table 4 suggest highly signicant employment eects
between 6 and 14 percentage points, for the other groups the eects are smaller
and not (or only slightly) signicant. The results for the ST8092 programs suggest
signicantly positive ATTs for women in strata 2 and 3 and for men in stratum
2 in the range 6.2 to 7.4 percentage points despite the mostly insignicant point
estimates in gure 3. The eects for the three other cases are smaller in size and not
signicant. For comparison, table 5 shows the averages of the ATTs including the
lockin eects: these are also always positive and only one case which is strongly
signicant without the lockin eect changes to being only marginally signicant
when the lockin period is included. This suggests that the lockin eects do not
dominate the overall program eects.
 Insert table 6 about here 
Table 6 shows gains and losses in terms of months employed cumulated over up to
two years (four years for the ST8092 programs, respectively) after program start as
a way of condensing the graphical results in gures 1 to 3. This measures by how
much participation in shortterm training increases the time spent in employment
in a given time period, when initial negative and subsequent positive employment
eects are weighed against each other. While the gains are very small or not even
positive over the rst 6 months, they increase for most groups over a longer period.
The positive employment eects of QST00 are conrmed again. The eects of
QST00 cumulated over 24 months are in general larger than those of MST00 and
ST8092. In the cases where we nd signicant eects after 24 months, these lie in a
range between one and 2.5 months. For example, men and women participating in
QST00 after having been unemployed between 7 and 12 months (stratum 2) gain 2.4
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months in employment during the rst 24 months after the program start. Women
participating in MST00 in stratum 2 gain 2.6 months in employment in two years.
For the ST8092 programs, there are surprisingly high gains for women who were
longterm unemployed before the program. After 48 months, we nd signicantly
positive cumulated employment eects of ST8092 programs (in one case signicance
is only at the 10% level) for women in strata 2 and 3 and for men in stratum 2.
 Insert gures 4, 5, and 6 about here 
The estimated treatment eects on earnings are shown in gures 4 to 6. The ATTs
shown are the dierence in earnings in a halfyear interval (in 1995 e) between
participants and matched controls. The pattern of the eect sizes and signicance
is similar to the one found for employment eects. In those cases where we nd
a signicant earnings eect it is usually about e1000 per halfyear. The largest
eect is found for females participating in QST00 in the rst stratum: it is highly
signicant, reaches e1000 in the second halfyear after the start of treatment and
is still about the same size three years after program start. The employment eect
for this group is also clearly positive and relatively constant at about 7 percentage
points until the end of the observation period. Given these numbers, it is possible
that the earnings eect may be driven to a large degree or even completely by
the employment gain.29 In sum, the estimated eects on earnings reect well the
remarkably high employment eects for some groups.
 Insert gures 7, 8, and 9 about here 
Figures 7 to 9 show the estimated treatment eects on the monthly participation
rates. Here, instead of the employment eect, we estimate the average eect of the
shortterm training program on the probability of participating in a longerterm
further training program. Participating in ST8092 has a signicant positive eect
on the probability of participating in a longterm further training program in the
months following the start of the ST8092 program for all groups (gure 9). The eect
reaches its maximum (8 to 15 percentage points) within the rst six months after
the start of the ST8092 program and then slowly fades away. Two years after the
start of ST8092 there remains a positive but small and not signicant eect (except
for men in stratum 1 for whom the eect is still slightly signicant). Figure 7 also
suggests positive treatment eects of participation in QST00 on future participation
29For example in 2001, gross monthly earnings were on average about e2500 (in 1995 e) for full
time employed individuals in West Germany (Institut der deutschen Wirtschaft, 2008).
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in longterm further training, but the eect is clearly signicant only for the rst
stratum. The eects are smaller for QST00 as compared to ST8092: participation
in QST00 increases the probability of participating in longterm training in a future
month by a maximum of 3 to 7 percentage points. 18 months after the start of the
QST00 program, the eect is still nonnegligible for most groups. For participation
in MST00 there is a positive and signicant eect on future participation in long
term training for all groups. The eect turns positive after a shorter period for
MST00 than for QST00, as MST00 programs are usually shorter. At its maximum
the eect lies between 11 to 15 percentage points, and 18 months after the start of
the treatment it has not declined by much.
 Insert table 7 about here 
Table 7 condenses these results by cumulating additional months in longterm train-
ing due to ST participation. For MST00 and ST8092 the eects are always highly
signicant, whereas only some of the eects are signicant for QST00. Participa-
tion in QST00 leads to an estimated increase in longterm training of between 0.3
months (not signicant) for women participating in stratum 2 and 1 month for men
in stratum 1 within two years after the start. For MST00 the eects are higher with
a maximal size of 2.6 months for men and women in stratum 1. The eects are a
bit smaller for ST8092 than for MST00 with a maximum of 1.9 months for women
in stratum 3. For ST00 the eects tend to be highest for those individuals partici-
pating soon after becoming unemployed (stratum 1), while in the earlier period for
men the highest eect is found in stratum 2 and for women in stratum 3.
In sum, our results suggest that participation in ST00 typically leads to an increase in
participation in longterm training of about one to two months. The eect is smaller
for QST00 which is not surprising as these programs aim at a limited skill upgrade
to directly enhance placement and less at an assessment. As a result, future program
participation is a bit less of an issue. MST00 on the contrary has a strong focus on
the assessment of the skills and opportunities of the jobseeker; thus, this program
leads to a strong increase in future participation in longterm training, because one
outcome of the assessment may be that a more substantive skill enhancement is
necessary. For ST8092, guiding hardtoplace jobseekers into a longterm training
program was an ocial goal. The estimated eects on participation rates reect
this goal. The typical duration of a longterm training program in Germany is
very heterogeneous; durations of 6 to 24 months are very common. Thus, it is not
surprising that the positive eect of ST participation on future program participation
is still nonnegligible two years after the start of the ST program. This reects those
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participants who start a very long program as a result of ST participation or who
do not start the longterm program immediately after the end of the ST program.30
This study investigates program eects of ST8092 programs over 13 calendar years.
Given this very long period, one could suspect that the employment eects dier
over calendar time. Possibly, the activation eect of such programs is higher for the
diculttoplace when unemployment is low or the programs give the unemployed
an additional edge when unemployment is high. In order to investigate eect hetero-
geneity, we regress the average individual treatment eects after the lockin period
(summarized in table 4) on year dummies, and the individual elapsed unemployment
duration to investigate whether the eects dier between years. Bootstrap standard
errors are calculated based on the resamples which are also used to calculate the
standard errors of the treatment eect estimates. In addition, we do the same ex-
ercise for the treatment eects including the lockin period and for the treatment
eects during the lockin period.
 Insert table 8 about here 
According to the results of these regressions, the ATTs do not dier over time, ir-
respective whether the lockin period is included, not included, or taken alone: a
2test of equality of the year dummies does not suggest any eect heterogeneity
(table 8).31 Thus, there is no evidence for the business cycle aecting the employ-
ment eects of shortterm training, a nding which is in contrast to the results for
longterm training programs in Lechner and Wunsch (2009). The result in Lechner
and Wunsch (2009) is mainly driven by the lockin eect which is typically very
long and pronounced for longterm training (see for example Biewen et al. (2007)).
The lockin eect of ST8092 is, on the contrary, quite short, which may explain why
our ndings are dierent from Lechner and Wunsch (2009).
6 Conclusions
During the last decade, there was a greater emphasis on job search assistance, moni-
toring and testing work availability, as well as limited training to activate the unem-
ployed (OECD, 2007). In Germany, the focus on activation strategies is reected in
30Figures 6 to 8 in the online appendix provide further information on the incidence and dura-
tion of future program participation for participants and matched nonparticipants.
31The coecients of these regressions are given in tables 10 to 13 in the additional online
appendix. The coecients are quite large, but very few of them are signicant and there is no
interpretable time pattern.
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the shift in the early 2000s away from traditional longer further training programs
lasting a couple of months up to two years to shortterm training programs (ST00)
with a median duration of four weeks. In fact, ST00 have become the largest pro-
gram in Germany regarding the number of participants with 1.07 Million individuals
entering such a program in 2007 (Bundesagentur für Arbeit, 2007, pp. 54, 57). Be-
tween 1980 and 1992, a similar large scale shortterm training program was in place
in Germany. These were the `Programs According to Article 41a of the Employment
Promotion Act' (ST8092).
This paper estimates the eects of shortterm training programs in West Germany
for the time periods 1980 to 1992 and 2000 to 2003 on the outcome variables em-
ployment, earnings and future participation in longterm training programs. This
is the rst paper to analyze these programs for the earlier time period and to es-
timate longrun eects on outcomes. Our results show that shortterm training
has mostly persistently positive and often signicant employment eects. The ef-
fects are particularly strong for participants starting training during months 7 to
12 of the unemployment spell. We have to stress at this point that, because of the
changing populations of unemployed across strata, our results do not imply that
moving participation from another time period to months 7 to 12 would on average
increase the employment gain from the treatment. We tend to nd smaller eects
for shortterm training starting during the second year of the unemployment spell.
When shortterm training focuses on testing and monitoring search eort, there are
smaller eects compared to when the focus is on training only. The lockin periods
lasted longer in the 1980s and 1990s compared to the early 2000s. The earnings
eects basically reect the pattern of the employment eects. Shortterm training
results in higher future participation in longterm training programs and this ef-
fect is much stronger for the earlier time period and for the testing and monitoring
variant than for the qualication variant. The employment eects of the ST8092
programs did not change signicantly by year between 1980 and 1992, i.e. there is
no evidence for business cycle eects in contrast to the results for longterm training
programs in Lechner and Wunsch (2009).
Our ndings most likely reect a change in active labor market policy between 1992
and 2000. In the 2000s, there is a strong focus on activating the unemployed. In
contrast, in the 1980s and 1990s it was accepted policy to `give the unemployed
some time' and to encourage them to participate in longterm training programs
when this seemed advisable and the unemployed were hard to place. Our results
suggest that the policy reorientation towards activation did not result in worse em-
ployment outcomes. If anything, as far as comparable, ST00 programs with a focus
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on training show better employment eects. As a caveat, we have to acknowledge,
however, that the estimated treatment eects for the two time periods are obtained
for dierent selective treatment samples, i.e. the eects can not be compared with-
out accounting for these dierences. ST8092 programs were particularly targeted at
individuals with lower reemployment chances, while the target group for ST00 is
broader. Any unemployed individual, for whom an assessment of his or her oppor-
tunities, a check of his or her willingness to work, or an upgrade of limited skills is
considered necessary, may be assigned to ST00. However, a simple comparison of
descriptive statistics of the participants in the earlier period and in the later period
does not reect these intended dierences in assignment policies. On the one hand,
participants in ST8092 tend to be a bit younger, are more likely to hold a vocational
training degree and are more likely to have been employed two years prior to the
start of the unemployment period in focus. On the other hand, there are fewer for-
eign nationals among them and fewer participants hold a university degree (tables
1 to 3 in additional online appendix).32 The participants of QST00 tend to have
slightly more favorable characteristics than the MST00 participants. Thus, there is
no strong indication that dierent selective treatment samples push the treatment
eect in a certain direction.
The fact that we nd some long lasting eects of shortterm training may be sur-
prising given their short duration. These programs by themselves do not provide a
sizeable human capital investment. Future research should investigate the hypothe-
sis that the positive program eects can be traced back to the higher participation
rates in longterm training programs. However, as one piece of evidence against
this hypothesis, we nd that in the case of QST00, which leads to particularly
positive employment eects, eects on future participation are lowest. A thorough
investigation of the hypothesis would require an evaluation approach for multiple
sequential treatments as e.g. the one developed by Lechner and Miquel (2010), but
it remains an open question whether the stringent identifying assumptions required
are satised in applications like ours.
An overall assessment of the microeconomic eects of shortterm training is not
possible, because the necessary information for a comprehensive costbenet analysis
is lacking in our data. But it is clear that ST00 programs are very inexpensive in
comparison. The direct costs are estimated at e343 for a median length MST00
program ande721 for a median length QST00 program (see section 5.2). In addition,
because of their short duration, ST programs involve short lockin eects, so their
32This simple comparison is based only on a few characteristics and it neglects that these charac-
teristics may dier in the population as well as in the sample of jobseekers between those periods.
Thus, it may still be the case that assignment was dierent in the two periods.
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cumulated employment eects may quickly become positive. In particular, QST00
participants enroling in months 7 to 12 of unemployment  for whom our results
suggest a 2.4 months employment gain within two years and only a 0.3 to 0.7 month
increase in future participation in longterm training (see tables 6 and 7)  are very
likely to exhibit a positive net benet. MST00 and ST8092 lead to slightly lower
employment eects and at the same time to higher future participation in longterm
training. In order to determine whether their net benet is positive, it would be
important to know the net benet of longterm training, because the net benet
of MST00 and ST8092 participation will be driven largely by the net benet of the
much more expensive longterm training programs. Biewen et al. (2007), among
others, nd positive employment eects of longterm training for some groups of
participants, but a costbenet analysis is not available. Even if the net benet
for the average participant of longterm training was known, this may not be a
good measure for those who are assigned to longterm training after shortterm
training. On the one hand, it may well be that those participants who start long
term training after shortterm training experience a higher benet than the average
participant because the monitoring in the shortterm training program may lead
to targeting the longterm program very well. On the other hand, it is possible
that the initial participation in shortterm training works as a starting point of
locking a jobseeker into longterm programs, even if there is no need for further
training. This would result in a lower than average benet for the former short
term training participant. To estimate the incremental eect of longterm training
following shortterm training is beyond the scope of this paper.
As a further caveat, the estimated positive treatment eects do not necessarily re-
ect positive general equilibrium eects. Training programs may lead to substitution
eects. A positive treatment eect for participants may reect an advantage of par-
ticipants relative to nonparticipants in applying for open positions and a negative
employment eect for those nonparticipants who would otherwise have received
a job oer. This may be relevant for shortterm training because these programs
do not aim at a sizeable human capital investment and will thus not lead to a
considerable human capital enhancement in the work force (an increase in human
capital may increase the number of vacancies). Such positive general equilibrium
eects through human capital investment are less likely for shortterm training. But
activating a large number of jobseekers might also have a positive general equilib-
rium eect through vacancy creation, as the job search eorts and the motivation
to nd a job may increase. In contrast to substitution eects, deadweight losses
seem less relevant for shortterm training (in particular for MST00), rst because
these programs are often assigned to those jobseekers with a need for activation
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and second because the direct program costs are low. In fact, the costs for all types
of shortterm training are fairly low, thus the repercussions through nancing these
programs are likely to be negligible. Unfortunately, our analysis does not allow us
to sign the possible bias in our partial equilibrium estimates. For the early time
period (ST8092), we think the bias is negligible because of the rather small size of
the program.
In both periods, direct placement of jobseekers was an important goal of shortterm
training and the positive employment eects we nd for both periods suggest that
shortterm training programs may be one useful component of active labor market
policies to achieve this goal. ST8092 programs also had the goal to (and in fact did)
increase future participation in long term training. MST00 also has a strong positive
eect on future participation, but in the early 2000s this was not a goal itself, but
rather one possible result of an assessment. The main focus in the period was on
activation, implying that a cheap and short assessment program should directly
lead to placement for a large fraction of participants. Our results suggest that
using MST00 for this strategy had only limited success  QST00, focusing less on
monitoring and more on teaching limited skills seems to be more successful in direct
placement. But one has to take into account that MST00 is also shorter and cheaper
than QST00 and that our evaluation strategy does not allow for direct comparison
of these programs as participants may dier. So the policy implication of our results
is that short and inexpensive training programs have been a useful component of
active labor market programs in both periods and that it might be advantageous to
use shortterm training programs which aim at teaching some limited skills instead
of very short programs which basically only aim at assessment and monitoring.
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Tables
Table 1: Entries into Active Labor Market Programs in West Germany 19791992
(in Thousand)
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983
Training Programs 209 247 280 266 306
 Further Training 149 162 190 189 220
 ShortTerm Training 0.7 14 25 23 24
 Retraining 31 38 47 42 42
 OntheJob Training 29 33 17 11 20
Job Creation Schemes 20 15 14 8 23
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
Training Programs 353 409 530 596 566
 Further Training 260 298 374 420 420
 ShortTerm Training 30 38 52 63 29
 Retraining 43 45 59 65 66
 OntheJob Training 19 28 45 49 51
Job creation schemes 26 34 41 42 38
1989 1990 1991 1992
Training programs 490 574 594 575
 Further Training 361 383 421 418
 ShortTerm Training 27 59 53 47
 Retraining 61 63 70 81
 OntheJob Training 41 68 49 29
Job Creation Schemes 28 27 28 18
Source: Bundesanstalt für Arbeit (19801993), Bundesanstalt für Arbeit (1985, 1994), own calcu-
lations.
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Table 2: Entries into Active Labor Market Programs in Germany and West Germany
19992004 (in Thousand)
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Germany
Qualication Programs 1,108 1,154 1,069 1,457 1,502 1,435
 Further and Retraining 491 552 450 456 255 185
 ShortTerm Training 432 477 565 877 1,064 1,188
Employment Subsidies 538 459 465 538 808 909
Placement and Advisory Ser-
vices
532 601 742 934 1,460 2,795
Job Creation Schemes 353 314 246 217 189 166
Specic Measures for Youths 530 446 496 447 389 408
Other 312 391 478 469 217 105
Total 3,373 3,365 3,496 4,062 4,565 5,818
West Germany
Qualication Programs 714 770 643 972 985 958
 Further and Retraining 307 338 261 273 161 124
 ShortTerm Training 265 286 339 545 690 789
Employment Subsidies 245 225 206 245 365 451
Placement and Advisory Ser-
vices
286 279 296 375 640 1,447
Job Creation Schemes 96 89 73 63 39 42
Specic Measures for Youths 426 364 191 210 262 270
Other 231 125 370 289 17 85
Total 1,997 1,852 1,778 2,154 2,308 3,253
Source: Bundesagentur für Arbeit (2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005), own calculations.
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Table 3: Participation in ShortTerm Training as a First Training Program for the
Inow Samples into Unemployment
Stratum Months 1 to 6 Months 7 to 12 Months 13 to 24
ShortTerm Training Between 1980 and 1992 (ST8092)
Male Participants 165 201 183
Male Comparisons 59921a 25674a 15631
Female Participants 145 145 167
Female Comparisons 35782a 22970 17020
ShortTerm Training in the Early 2000s (ST00)
Male Participants QST00 559 221 211
Male Participants MST00 531 177 214
Male Comparisons 20979 8337 5122
Female Participants QST00 537 214 130
Female Participants MST00 325 126 115
Female Comparisons 13848 7070 4975
Notes: QST00 refers to the qualication variant of shortterm training administered in the early
2000s and MST00 to the monitoring variant. For entries marked with a a, we randomly selected
half of the available nonparticipants due to computational constraints.
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Table 4: Average ATT After LockIn Period
QST00
Men Women
Stratum 1 0.028 (0.016) 0.070 (0.020)
Stratum 2 0.111 (0.031) 0.130 (0.034)
Stratum 3 0.092 (0.026) 0.025 (0.032)
MST00
Men Women
Stratum 1 0.014 (0.019) 0.024 (0.019)
Stratum 2 0.027 (0.025) 0.143 (0.042)
Stratum 3 0.063 (0.025) 0.038 (0.032)
ST8092
Men Women
Stratum 1 0.043 (0.029) 0.025 (0.034)
Stratum 2 0.062 (0.027) 0.074 (0.036)
Stratum 3 0.030 (0.028) 0.071 (0.026)
Notes: QST00 refers to the qualication variant of shortterm training administered in the early
2000s and MST00 to the monitoring variant. ST8092 denotes shortterm training administered
between 1980 and 1992. Average of the monthly treatment eects from month zero (program start)
until the end of the observation period, i.e. until month 36 in the rst stratum, month 30 in the
second, and month 18 in the third for QST00 and MST00 programs, and until month 48 for ST8092
programs.  = statistically signicant at 1%,  = at 5%,  = at 10%. Bootstrapped standard
errors based on 250 replications.
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Table 5: Average ATT Including LockIn Period
QST00
Female=0 Female=1
Stratum 1 0.019 (0.015) 0.056 (0.018)
Stratum 2 0.099 (0.027) 0.104 (0.030)
Stratum 3 0.080 (0.022) 0.012 (0.025)
MST00
Female=0 Female=1
Stratum 1 0.008 (0.017) 0.015 (0.018)
Stratum 2 0.021 (0.022) 0.123 (0.037)
Stratum 3 0.052 (0.021) 0.028 (0.026)
ST8092
Men Women
Stratum 1 0.029 (0.027) 0.019 (0.031)
Stratum 2 0.049 (0.024) 0.059 (0.033)
Stratum 3 0.026 (0.026) 0.065 (0.023)
Notes: QST00 refers to the qualication variant of shortterm training administered in the early
2000s and MST00 to the monitoring variant. ST8092 denotes shortterm training administered
between 1980 and 1992. Average of the monthly treatment eects from month zero (program start)
until the end of the observation period, i.e. until month 36 in the rst stratum, month 30 in the
second, and month 18 in the third for QST00 and MST00 programs, and until month 48 for ST8092
programs.  = statistically signicant at 1%,  = at 5%,  = at 10%. Bootstrapped standard
errors based on 250 replications.
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Table 6: Cumulated Treatment Eects  Employment
QST00, Men
6 Months 12 Months 24 Monthsa
Stratum 1 -0.145 (0.090) -0.015 (0.187) 0.262 (0.378)
Stratum 2 0.274 (0.139) 1.005 (0.308) 2.429 (0.657)
Stratum 3 0.319 (0.108) 0.799 (0.241) 1.518 (0.409)
QST00, Women
6 Months 12 Months 24 Monthsa
Stratum 1 -0.080 (0.083) 0.369 (0.191) 1.197 (0.422)
Stratum 2 -0.009 (0.139) 0.669 (0.313) 2.419 (0.699)
Stratum 3 -0.108 (0.089) 0.013 (0.254) 0.224 (0.482)
MST00, Men
6 Months 12 Months 24 Monthsa
Stratum 1 -0.142 (0.089) -0.167 (0.191) -0.175 (0.403)
Stratum 2 -0.029 (0.115) 0.142 (0.277) 0.378 (0.560)
Stratum 3 0.166 (0.096) 0.557 (0.236) 0.984 (0.393)
MST00, Women
6 Months 12 Months 24 Monthsa
Stratum 1 -0.203 (0.102) -0.322 (0.230) -0.044 (0.452)
Stratum 2 0.223 (0.162) 0.907 (0.404) 2.590 (0.896)
Stratum 3 0.038 (0.107) 0.265 (0.277) 0.533 (0.498)
ST8092, Men
6 Months 12 Months 24 Months 48 Months
Stratum 1 -0.448 (0.143) -0.343 (0.315) -0.050 (0.631) 1.308 (1.274)
Stratum 2 -0.285 (0.118) -0.004 (0.300) 0.910 (0.627) 2.336 (1.168)
Stratum 3 -0.042 (0.116) 0.161 (0.258) 0.522 (0.552) 1.271 (1.236)
ST8092, Women
6 Months 12 Months 24 Months 48 Months
Stratum 1 -0.150 (0.142) 0.039 (0.342) 0.289 (0.770) 0.917 (1.501)
Stratum 2 -0.302 (0.154) 0.019 (0.389) 0.910 (0.844) 2.813 (1.595)
Stratum 3 0.130 (0.104) 0.613 (0.245) 1.675 (0.543) 3.124 (1.122)
Notes: QST00 refers to the qualication variant of shortterm training administered in the early
2000s and MST00 to the monitoring variant. ST8092 denotes shortterm training administered
between 1980 and 1992. Sum of the monthly treatment eects from month zero (program start).
In columns marked with a a, the treatment eects are summed over 18 months in stratum 3. 
= statistically signicant at 1%,  = at 5%,  = at 10%. Bootstrapped standard errors based on
250 replications.
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Table 7: Cumulated Treatment Eects  Participation in LongTerm Training
QST00, Men
6 Months 12 Months 24 Monthsa
Stratum 1 0.198 (0.050) 0.525 (0.110) 1.033 (0.211)
Stratum 2 0.077 (0.068) 0.293 (0.146) 0.669 (0.289)
Stratum 3 0.056 (0.059) 0.186 (0.121) 0.383 (0.186)
QST00, Women
6 Months 12 Months 24 Monthsa
Stratum 1 0.156 (0.049) 0.471 (0.108) 0.894 (0.193)
Stratum 2 0.047 (0.082) 0.188 (0.189) 0.316 (0.319)
Stratum 3 0.114 (0.078) 0.366 (0.184) 0.569 (0.282)
MST00, Men
6 Months 12 Months 24 Monthsa
Stratum 1 0.588 (0.070) 1.383 (0.157) 2.627 (0.305)
Stratum 2 0.556 (0.112) 1.393 (0.238) 2.422 (0.426)
Stratum 3 0.383 (0.087) 1.045 (0.200) 1.503 (0.293)
MST00, Women
6 Months 12 Months 24 Monthsa
Stratum 1 0.535 (0.089) 1.403 (0.197) 2.632 (0.371)
Stratum 2 0.425 (0.150) 1.092 (0.324) 2.014 (0.556)
Stratum 3 0.348 (0.110) 0.945 (0.269) 1.585 (0.440)
ST8092, Men
6 Months 12 Months 24 Months 48 months
Stratum 1 0.339 (0.110) 0.630 (0.196) 1.242 (0.350) 1.907 (0.541)
Stratum 2 0.492 (0.104) 1.034 (0.202) 1.579 (0.320) 2.119 (0.438)
Stratum 3 0.328 (0.087) 0.780 (0.185) 1.366 (0.326) 1.549 (0.420)
ST8092, Women
6 Months 12 Months 24 Months 48 Months
Stratum 1 0.539 (0.125) 1.093 (0.232) 1.353 (0.359) 1.274 (0.405)
Stratum 2 0.495 (0.126) 1.015 (0.255) 1.456 (0.379) 1.675 (0.473)
Stratum 3 0.502 (0.094) 1.244 (0.217) 1.890 (0.366) 2.188 (0.475)
Notes: QST00 refers to the qualication variant of shortterm training administered in the early
2000s and MST00 to the monitoring variant. ST8092 denotes shortterm training administered
between 1980 and 1992. Sum of the monthly treatment eects from month zero (program start).
In columns marked with a a, the treatment eects are summed over 18 months in stratum 3. 
= statistically signicant at 1%,  = at 5%,  = at 10%. Bootstrapped standard errors based on
250 replications.
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Table 8: Test of Heterogeneity of Employment Eects over Time
2Statistic (pValue)
Including LockIn Period
Men Women
Stratum 1 7.82 (0.729) 2.53 (0.996)
Stratum 2 14.75 (0.194) 10.85 (0.370)
Stratum 3 9.27 (0.597) 11.88 (0.373)
After LockIn Period
Men Women
Stratum 1 7.68 (0.741) 2.33 (0.997)
Stratum 2 15.27 (0.171) 11.08 (0.352)
Stratum 3 9.66 (0.561) 11.79 (0.380)
During LockIn Period
Men Women
Stratum 1 5.58 (0.900) 9.84 (0.545)
Stratum 2 9.04 (0.618) 4.72 (0.909)
Stratum 3 8.14 (0.700) 7.86 (0.726)
Notes: Test of equality of all year dummies in a regression of the individual treatment eects aver-
aged over the months after program start on year dummies and elapsed unemployment duration.
Empirical standard errors are calculated from bootstrap 250 resamples.
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Figures
Figure 1: Average Treatment Eect on the Treated for QST00  Employment
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Notes: QST00 refers to the qualication variant of shortterm training administered in the early
2000s. Dierence in employment rates is measured on the ordinate, preunemployment (< 0) and
posttreatment ( 0) months on the abscissa. Dashed lines are 95%-condence intervals based on
250 bootstrap replications.
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Figure 2: Average Treatment Eect on the Treated for MST00  Employment
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Notes: MST00 refers to the monitoring variant of shortterm training administered in the early
2000s. Dierence in employment rates is measured on the ordinate, preunemployment (< 0) and
posttreatment ( 0) months on the abscissa. Dashed lines are 95%-condence intervals based on
250 bootstrap replications.
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Figure 3: Average Treatment Eect on the Treated for ST8092  Employment
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Notes: ST8092 refers to shortterm training administered between 1980 and 1992. Dierence
in employment rates is measured on the ordinate, preunemployment (< 0) and posttreatment
( 0) months on the abscissa. Dashed lines are 95%-condence intervals based on 250 bootstrap
replications.
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Figure 4: Average Treatment Eect on the Treated for QST00  Earnings
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Notes: QST00 refers to the qualication variant of shortterm training administered in the early
2000s. Dierence in real earnings (in 1995 e) within a sixmonth period is measured on the
ordinate, preunemployment (< 0) and posttreatment ( 0) sixmonth periods on the abscissa.
Dashed lines are 95%-condence intervals based on 250 bootstrap replications.
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Figure 5: Average Treatment Eect on the Treated for MST00  Earnings
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Notes: MST00 refers to the monitoring variant of shortterm training administered in the early
2000s. Dierence in real earnings (in 1995 e) within a sixmonth period is measured on the
ordinate, preunemployment (< 0) and posttreatment ( 0) sixmonth periods on the abscissa.
Dashed lines are 95%-condence intervals based on 250 bootstrap replications.
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Figure 6: Average Treatment Eect on the Treated for ST8092  Earnings
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Notes: ST8092 refers to shortterm training administered between 1980 and 1992. Dierence
in real earnings (in 1995 e) within a sixmonth period is measured on the ordinate, pre
unemployment (< 0) and posttreatment ( 0) sixmonth periods on the abscissa. Dashed lines
are 95%-condence intervals based on 250 bootstrap replications.
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Figure 7: Average Treatment Eect on the Treated for QST00  Participation in
LongTerm Training
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Notes: QST00 refers to the qualication variant of shortterm training administered in the early
2000s. Dierence in participation rates is measured on the ordinate, posttreatment months on
the abscissa. Dashed lines are 95%-condence intervals based on 250 bootstrap replications.
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Figure 8: Average Treatment Eect on the Treated for MST00  Participation in
LongTerm Training
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Notes: MST00 refers to the monitoring variant of shortterm training administered in the early
2000s. Dierence in participation rates is measured on the ordinate, posttreatment months on
the abscissa. Dashed lines are 95%-condence intervals based on 250 bootstrap replications.
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Figure 9: Average Treatment Eect on the Treated for ST8092  Participation in
LongTerm Training
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Notes: ST8092 refers to shortterm training administered between 1980 and 1992. Dierence in
participation rates is measured on the ordinate, posttreatment months on the abscissa. Dashed
lines are 95%-condence intervals based on 250 bootstrap replications.
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Online Appendix to Déjà Vu? ShortTerm Train-
ing in Germany 19801992 and 20002003
By Bernd Fitzenberger, Olga Orlanski, Aderonke Osikominu, and Marie Paul
Table 1: Means of Important Variables for the 20002003 Treatment Sample, QST00
Label Men Women
Personal Attributes
Age at start of unemployment  25 and 29 0.169 0.151
Age at start of unemployment  30 and 34 0.209 0.154
Age at start of unemployment  35 and 39 0.227 0.212
Age at start of unemployment  40 and 44 0.161 0.203
Age at start of unemployment  45 and 49 0.142 0.188
Age at start of unemployment  50 and 53 0.092 0.092
NonGerman nationality 0.157 0.080
Vocational training degree 0.568 0.637
University or technical college degree 0.060 0.060
Last Employment
Elementary occupations, skilled agriculture, shery workers 0.192 0.101
Craftsmen, machine operators and related 0.445 0.145
Service workers 0.077 0.256
Clerks 0.125 0.285
Technicians and associate professionals 0.101 0.136
Professionals and managers 0.059 0.077
Manufacturing 0.269 0.173
Construction, agriculture, forestry, shing 0.139 0.041
Trade and transport 0.301 0.342
Financial, renting and business 0.174 0.178
Other Services 0.117 0.266
Employment History
Employed in month 12 before start of unemployment 0.756 0.764
Employed in month 24 before start of unemployment 0.636 0.625
Notes: For rows marked with a , missings are included in a separate category not shown in the
table.
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Table 2: Means of Important Variables for the 20002003 Treatment Sample, MST00
Label Men Women
Personal Attributes
Age at start of unemployment  25 and 29 0.190 0.158
Age at start of unemployment  30 and 34 0.244 0.187
Age at start of unemployment  35 and 39 0.230 0.215
Age at start of unemployment  40 and 44 0.157 0.195
Age at start of unemployment  45 and 49 0.102 0.155
Age at start of unemployment  50 and 53 0.078 0.090
NonGerman nationality 0.188 0.107
Vocational training degree 0.519 0.532
University or technical college degree 0.042 0.063
Last Employment
Elementary occupations, skilled agriculture, shery workers 0.205 0.127
Craftsmen, machine operators and related 0.478 0.148
Service workers 0.084 0.269
Clerks 0.103 0.239
Technicians and associate professionals 0.082 0.137
Professionals and managers 0.048 0.079
Manufacturing 0.256 0.188
Construction, agriculture, forestry, shing 0.194 0.03
Trade and transport 0.288 0.331
Financial, renting and business 0.171 0.174
Other Services 0.091 0.276
Employment History
Employed in month 12 before start of unemployment 0.714 0.711
Employed in month 24 before start of unemployment 0.599 0.583
Notes: For rows marked with a , missings are included in a separate category not shown in the
table.
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Table 3: Means of Important Variables for the 19801992 Treatment Sample, ST8092
Label Men Women
Personal Attributes
Age at start of unemployment  25 and 29 0.260 0.306
Age at start of unemployment  30 and 34 0.211 0.212
Age at start of unemployment  35 and 39 0.164 0.182
Age at start of unemployment  40 and 44 0.180 0.133
Age at start of unemployment  45 and 49 0.120 0.107
Age at start of unemployment  50 and 53 0.064 0.059
NonGerman nationality 0.115 0.046
Vocational training degree 0.747 0.713
University or technical college degree 0.044 0.042
Last Employment
Fulltime blue collar employee 0.732 0.328
Fulltime white collar employee 0.250 0.492
Apprentice, worker at home, parttime working 0.018 0.180
Production oriented services, trade, banking 0.317 0.337
Metal, vehicles, electronics 0.175 0.123
Consumer oriented, organizational, and social services 0.149 0.315
Construction, agriculture 0.149 0.030
Light industry 0.097 0.140
Basic materials 0.113 0.060
Employment History
Employed in month 12 before start of unemployment 0.690 0.790
Employed in month 24 before start of unemployment 0.658 0.718
Notes: For rows marked with a , missings are included in a separate category not shown in the
table.
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Table 4: Variable Denitions for the 20002003 Sample
Label Denition
Personal Attributes
female 1 if female, 0 otherwise
agegroup age in 6 groups
foreigner 1 if citizenship is not German, 0 otherwise or missing
qualication 1 no degree or missing, 2 vocational training degree, 3 univer-
sity or technical college degree
schooling 1 no schooling degree or missing, 2 Hauptschulabschluss or
Mittlere Reife /Fachoberschule (degrees reached after com-
pletion of the 9th or 10th grade), 3 Fachhochschulreife or
Abitur/Hochschulreife (degrees reached after completion of
the 12th or 13th grade)
health 1 no health problems mentioned, 2 health problems, but con-
sidered without impact on placement, 3 health problems con-
sidered to have an impact on placement
pasthealth same categories as health, but referring to the past two years
before the beginning of the unemployment spell
disabled 1 if disabled, 0 no disability mentioned
married 1 missing, 2 married, 3 not married
child 1 if at least one child, 0 otherwise or missing
youngchild 1 if at least one child younger than 10 years, 0 otherwise or
missing
Last Employment
occupation occupation of last employment in 7 categories
industry industry of last employment in 6 categories
endlastjob 2 termination of last job by employer, 3 by employee, 4 limited
in time, 5 other and missing
waged daily wage in the last job(s) before the beginning of the un-
employment spell
ddssec ddsec is 1 if earnings are within the social security thresholds
lnwage log(waged) interacted with ddssec
parttime 1 if the person worked less than fulltime in the last employ-
ment, 0 otherwise
<continued on next page>
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Label Denition
onlyparttime 1 if information available that only parttime job is desired,
0 otherwise
Employment and Program History
problemgroup 1 if participated in a program with a social work compo-
nent (i.e. in a program supporting rehabilitation and socio-
professional integration) within the last three years, 0 other-
wise
pasttreatnotcompl 1 if a benet spell was terminated as a result of dropping out
of an active labor market program in the past three years, 0
otherwise
penalty 1 if the unemployed had a period of disqualication from ben-
ets within the last three years, 0 otherwise
motivationlack 1 if within the last three years a benet or job search spell
was terminated or suspended because the person has failed
to comply with the rules, e.g. if he/she has missed out on
a meeting with the caseworker or has not cooperated in a
sucient way; 0 otherwise
countemp, coun-
tub, countua,
countsub, coun-
toos, countcon
number of days within the last three years before the begin-
ning of unemployment spent in regular employment, receiv-
ing unemployment benets, unemployment assistance, subsis-
tance payment, out of sample, in contact with the labor oce,
respectively
dcount. . . 1 if the respective count variable is larger than 0, 0 otherwise
demp6, demp12,
demp24,
demp6_12,
demp12_24
1 if in regular employment 6, 12, 24, 6 and 12 and 12 and 24
months, respectively, before the beginning of the unemploy-
ment spell
claimg remaining claim on unemployment benet in four categories
Regional Information
area German Bundesländer aggregated into 6 categories. 1 SH, NI,
HB, HH; 2 NW, 3 HE, RP, SL; 4 BY, BW; 5 MV, BB, BE; 6
SN, ST, TH
region classication of the districts of residence according to local
labor market conditions in 5 groups
<continued on next page>
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Label Denition
Calendar Time of Entry into Unemployment
quarter calendar quarter of the end of the last employment (enumer-
ates the six quarters of our inow sample)
Notes: If not mentioned otherwise, variables are dened relative to the beginning of the time win-
dow of elapsed unemployment duration. Variables in categories are used as dummies, i.e. agegroup1
equals 1 if agegroup takes the value 1 and 0 otherwise. If there are only few observations with
missing values on a particular variable, these are subsumed into one of the substantive categories.
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Table 5: Estimated Coecients of the Propensity Scores for the
20002003 Sample
Participation Probit for QST00, Males
Stratum 1 Stratum 2 Stratum 3
agegroup1 -0.166 (0.098) -0.160 (0.120)
agegroup12 0.001 (0.041)
agegroup2 -0.123 (0.088) -0.090 (0.102)
agegroup4 -0.002 (0.090) -0.082 (0.107)
agegroup5 -0.080 (0.105) 0.214 (0.102)
agegroup6 0.140 (0.106) 0.145 (0.113)
area2 -0.082 (0.081) -0.151 (0.085)
area3 -0.008 (0.097) -0.125 (0.113)
area4 -0.129 (0.112) -0.319 (0.130)
child 0.116 (0.048) 0.087 (0.067) 0.179 (0.071)
claimg0 -0.031 (0.105) 0.043 (0.095)
claimg1 0.130 (0.103)
claimg2 0.116 (0.088) -0.124 (0.085) -0.072 (0.101)
claimg3 0.096 (0.098)
claimg34 -0.383 (0.116) -0.210 (0.119)
claimg4 0.169 (0.108)
countcon 0 (0.000) 0 (0.000) 0 (0.000)
countemp 0 (0.000) 0.001 (0.000) 0 (0.000)
dcountcon 0.068 (0.053) 0.021 (0.079) 0.029 (0.086)
dcountoos 0.011 (0.078) -0.148 (0.086)
dcountsub 0.214 (0.071)
ddssec 0.607 (0.242)
demp12_24 0.195 (0.074) -0.045 (0.115) 0.055 (0.144)
demp24 -0.150 (0.076) 0.010 (0.121) 0.009 (0.144)
demp6 0.026 (0.063) -0.033 (0.097) 0.292 (0.114)
endlastjob2 0.045 (0.046)
endlastjob4 0.236 (0.064)
industry3 -0.162 (0.086) -0.267 (0.095)
industry5 0.095 (0.078) -0.192 (0.099)
industry6 -0.027 (0.097) -0.151 (0.104)
lnwaged -0.135 (0.053)
married2 0.165 (0.044) 0.167 (0.065) 0.281 (0.071)
motivationlack 0.105 (0.055)
occupation1 0.102 (0.073)
occupation3 -0.013 (0.065)
occupation5 0.243 (0.080)
occupation6 0.139 (0.086)
occupation7 -0.002 (0.105)
problemgroup 0.224 (0.092)
quarter1 -0.199 (0.054) -0.196 (0.105) -0.154 (0.104)
quarter2 0.029 (0.104) -0.211 (0.117)
quarter3 0.091 (0.095) -0.182 (0.110)
quarter4 -0.120 (0.051) -0.062 (0.094) -0.122 (0.100)
quarter5 -0.086 (0.049)
quarter6 0.121 (0.093) -0.115 (0.101)
region2 -0.237 (0.097) -0.092 (0.096)
region4 0.090 (0.104) 0.157 (0.115)
region5 0.038 (0.095) 0.225 (0.115)
schooling3 0.143 (0.060)
youngchild -0.048 (0.062)
intercept -2.633 (0.169) -2.354 (0.231) -1.961 (0.265)
<continued on next page>
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Table 5: Estimated Coecients of the Propensity Scores for the
20002003 Sample
N 21538 8558 5333
Participation Probit for MST00, Males
Stratum 1 Stratum 2 Stratum 3
agegroup1 0.063 (0.095)
agegroup2 0.231 (0.080)
agegroup56 -0.033 (0.050) 0.006 (0.098)
child 0.189 (0.072) 0.115 (0.068)
claimg0 -0.027 (0.079) -0.059 (0.215) 0.142 (0.097)
claimg0_dcountoos 0.370 (0.206)
claimg1 0.053 (0.084) -0.040 (0.195) -0.085 (0.108)
claimg1_dcountoos 0.286 (0.204)
claimg2 0.221 (0.107)
claimg34 0.008 (0.047) -0.124 (0.117)
countub -0 (0.000)
dcountcon 0.091 (0.054) 0.129 (0.084)
dcountoos 0.064 (0.042) -0.169 (0.091)
dcountsub 0.237 (0.112)
dcountub -0.135 (0.046)
demp12 0.005 (0.151) 0.029 (0.138)
demp24 -0.029 (0.080) 0.054 (0.073)
demp6_12 0.124 (0.050) 0.106 (0.153) -0.127 (0.133)
endlastjob2 0.102 (0.046)
endlastjob3 -0.172 (0.117)
endlastjob4 0.135 (0.071)
foreigner -0.291 (0.096)
health2 0.284 (0.127)
health3 -0.110 (0.135)
industry2 0.520 (0.171)
industry3 0.314 (0.171) -0.093 (0.099)
industry4 0.432 (0.170) -0.067 (0.085)
industry5 0.500 (0.173) -0.150 (0.103)
industry6 0.350 (0.180) -0.321 (0.121)
married2 0.129 (0.042) 0.220 (0.069) 0.234 (0.071)
motivationlack 0.109 (0.055) -0.027 (0.078)
pasthealth1 0.346 (0.123)
pasthealth2 -0.063 (0.172)
pasthealth3 0.312 (0.149)
penalty 0.219 (0.126)
qualication1 0.107 (0.041) 0.182 (0.068) 0.041 (0.066)
quarter1 0 (0.070)
quarter3 0.008 (0.075)
quarter4 -0.056 (0.071) 0.098 (0.088)
quarter5 -0.034 (0.070) 0.186 (0.084)
quarter6 0.161 (0.071) 0.141 (0.092)
region2 0.536 (0.079)
region3 0.278 (0.074) -0.037 (0.086) -0.140 (0.082)
region4 -0.194 (0.126) -0.258 (0.121)
region5 0.122 (0.080) -0.169 (0.102) -0.283 (0.101)
schooling3 0.090 (0.057)
intercept -2.961 (0.207) -2.406 (0.170) -2.176 (0.206)
N 21510 8514 5336
<continued on next page>
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Table 5: Estimated Coecients of the Propensity Scores for the
20002003 Sample
Participation Probit for QST00, Females
Stratum 1 Stratum 2 Stratum 3
agegroup12 -0.113 (0.048) -0.228 (0.099)
agegroup4 0.193 (0.080)
agegroup56 -0.021 (0.053) 0.155 (0.081) 0.158 (0.094)
child 0.116 (0.045) 0.223 (0.068) 0.197 (0.088)
claimg0 -0.042 (0.127) 0.187 (0.122) 0.242 (0.118)
claimg2 0.166 (0.095) 0.254 (0.109) 0.143 (0.126)
claimg34 0.173 (0.100) 0.126 (0.149) 0.153 (0.141)
claimg34_married2 0.242 (0.170)
countcon 0 (0.000) 0.001 (0.000) 0 (0.000)
countemp 0 (0.000) 0 (0.000) -0 (0.001)
countoos 0.001 (0.000) 0 (0.000)
dcountcon 0.135 (0.057)
dcountoos -0.084 (0.054)
dcountua 0.170 (0.108)
dcountub 0.087 (0.088)
ddssec -4.380 (1.263)
demp12 0.049 (0.133) 0.075 (0.188) -0.178 (0.277)
demp12_24 -0.037 (0.076) 0.072 (0.120) 0.239 (0.159)
demp6 0.027 (0.092) 0.027 (0.126) 0.235 (0.159)
demp6_12 -0.015 (0.136) 0.034 (0.198) 0.145 (0.275)
endlastjob2 0.227 (0.056) 0.375 (0.084)
endlastjob3 0.291 (0.075) 0.139 (0.123)
endlastjob4 0.081 (0.072) 0.122 (0.113)
foreigner -0.301 (0.115)
health2 -0.271 (0.143)
health3 0.079 (0.139) 0.234 (0.117)
industry3 0.282 (0.118)
industry4 0.062 (0.058) 0.172 (0.085)
industry5 0.068 (0.067) 0.044 (0.102)
industry6 0.015 (0.061) 0.030 (0.090)
lnwaged 2.241 (0.660)
lnwagedsq -0.281 (0.086)
married2 0.222 (0.044) 0.200 (0.074) 0.455 (0.083)
motivationlack -0.082 (0.085)
pasthealth2 0.326 (0.138)
pasthealth3 -0.041 (0.147)
pasttreatnotcompl 0.155 (0.339)
penalty 0.332 (0.159)
problemgroup 0.240 (0.117)
region2 0.075 (0.058)
region3 0.026 (0.096)
region4 0.086 (0.123)
region5 0.114 (0.100)
intercept -2.408 (0.224) -3.386 (0.470) -2.733 (0.521)
N 14385 7284 5105
<continued on next page>
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Table 5: Estimated Coecients of the Propensity Scores for the
20002003 Sample
Participation Probit for MST00, Females
Stratum 1 Stratum 2 Stratum 3
agegroup1 -0.175 (0.117)
agegroup2 -0.207 (0.106)
agegroup4 0.261 (0.115)
agegroup5 0.280 (0.116)
agegroup56 -0.262 (0.098) -0.169 (0.123)
agegroup6 0.372 (0.117)
area3 -0.214 (0.111)
child 0.213 (0.055) 0.104 (0.089)
claimg0 -0.045 (0.117) 0.324 (0.147) 0.178 (0.117)
claimg1 -0.070 (0.109) 0.105 (0.126) -0.053 (0.132)
claimg3 0.098 (0.101) -0.143 (0.133)
claimg34 -0.066 (0.129)
claimg3_dcountoos -0.114 (0.116)
claimg4 0.506 (0.140) 0.023 (0.164)
claimg4_dcountoos -0.380 (0.182)
countoos 0 (0.000) -0 (0.000)
countub -0.001 (0.001) -0.001 (0.000)
dcountcon 0.066 (0.062) 0.073 (0.094)
dcountoos 0.154 (0.092)
dcountsub 0.264 (0.163)
demp12 0.059 (0.090) -0.174 (0.242) -0.288 (0.127)
demp12_24 0.045 (0.131)
demp24 0.037 (0.130) 0.021 (0.156) -0.120 (0.141)
demp6 0.095 (0.087)
demp6_12 0.295 (0.245)
endlastjob2 0.147 (0.065) 0.161 (0.089)
endlastjob3 0.229 (0.089)
endlastjob4 0.138 (0.080) 0.189 (0.116)
lncountemp -0.087 (0.092) -1.548 (1.464) -0.626 (1.361)
lncountempsq 0.135 (0.131) 0.062 (0.119)
married2 0.201 (0.054) 0.271 (0.080) 0.193 (0.087)
onlyparttime -0.120 (0.066)
parttime -0.005 (0.079) -0.073 (0.084)
qualication1 0.148 (0.053) 0.173 (0.083)
quarter1 0.295 (0.087) 0.282 (0.140)
quarter2 0.235 (0.092) 0.263 (0.149) 0.141 (0.167)
quarter3 0.275 (0.088) 0.375 (0.136) 0.169 (0.162)
quarter4 0.317 (0.151)
quarter5 0.350 (0.083) 0.225 (0.137) 0.232 (0.151)
quarter6 0.231 (0.091) 0.413 (0.136) 0.337 (0.153)
region2 0.457 (0.100) 0.312 (0.132) 0.460 (0.169)
region3 0.309 (0.091) 0.426 (0.103) 0.355 (0.156)
region4 0.129 (0.154)
region5 0.150 (0.097) 0.099 (0.172)
schooling3 0.084 (0.064)
youngchild -0.232 (0.121) 0.353 (0.105)
intercept -2.563 (0.540) 1.394 (4.026) -1.093 (3.846)
N 14173 7196 5090
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Table 6: Results of Smith and Todd (2005) Balancing Test for the 20002003 Sample
QST00, Males, Cubic of Pscore
P-values>.1 P-values>.05 P-values>.01 Regressors
Stratum 1 28 29 30 30
Stratum 2 27 30 31 31
Stratum 3 28 30 31 31
QST00, Males, Quartic of Pscore
P-values>.1 P-values>.05 P-values>.01 Regressors
Stratum 1 28 28 30 30
Stratum 2 26 27 31 31
Stratum 3 31 31 31 31
MST00, Males, Cubic of Pscore
P-values>.1 P-values>.05 P-values>.01 Regressors
Stratum 1 26 28 28 28
Stratum 2 23 23 23 23
Stratum 3 23 23 25 25
MST00, Males, Quartic of Pscore
P-values>.1 P-values>.05 P-values>.01 Regressors
Stratum 1 26 27 28 28
Stratum 2 20 23 23 23
Stratum 3 22 23 25 25
QST00, Females, Cubic of Pscore
P-values>.1 P-values>.05 P-values>.01 Regressors
Stratum 1 30 31 31 31
Stratum 2 28 29 30 30
Stratum 3 15 15 15 15
QST00, Females, Quartic of Pscore
P-values>.1 P-values>.05 P-values>.01 Regressors
Stratum 1 30 31 31 31
Stratum 2 24 29 30 30
Stratum 3 14 14 15 15
MST00, Females, Cubic of Pscore
P-values>.1 P-values>.05 P-values>.01 Regressors
Stratum 1 25 28 30 30
Stratum 2 29 29 30 30
Stratum 3 22 24 25 25
MST00, Females, Quartic of Pscore
P-values>.1 P-values>.05 P-values>.01 Regressors
Stratum 1 27 29 30 30
Stratum 2 28 30 30 30
Stratum 3 20 23 25 25
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Table 7: Variable Denitions for the 19801992 Sample
Label Denition
Personal Attributes
aXXYY Age at start of unemployment XX and  YY
age Age at start of unemployment
lnage logage at start of unemployment
female Female
foreign NonGerman citizenship
kids Has dependent children
married Married
BIL1 No vocational training degree or information missing
BIL2 Vocational training degree
BIL3 Abitur/No vocational training degree
BIL4 University or technical college degree
BIL5 Missing
Last Employment
BER1 Apprentice
BER2 Fulltime blue collar employee
BER3 Fulltime white collar employee
BER4 Working from home with low hours or information missing
BER5 Parttime working
pentg Daily earnings  e15 per day in 1995 e
entgcens Earnings censored at social security taxation threshold
entg Daily earnings if pentg=1 and entgcens=0, otherwise zero
logentg log of entg if pentg=1 and entgcens=0, otherwise zero
claim0 Entitlement to unemployment benets at beginning of Stra-
tum 1
claim181 Entitlement to unemployment benets at beginning of Stra-
tum 2
claim361 Entitlement to unemployment benets at beginning of Stra-
tum 3
lnclaimX log of claimX if claimX > 0, else zero (X = 0, 181, 361)
claimXg0 claimX=0
claimXg1 claimX>0 and claim0  170
claimXg2 claimX>170 and claim0  350
claimXg3 claimX>350
Last Employer
WZW1 Agriculture
WZW2 Basic materials
WZW3 Metal, vehicles, electronics
WZW4 Light industry
WZW5 Construction
WZW6 Production oriented services, trade, banking
WZW7 Consumer oriented, organizational, and social services, miss-
ings
<continued on next page>
12
Label Denition
frmsize1 Firm Size (employment) missing or  10
frmsize2 Firm Size (employment) > 10 and  200
frmsize3 Firm Size (employment) > 200 and  500
frmsize4 Firm Size (employment) > 500
Employment and Program History
preexM Employed M (M=6, 12, 24) month before unemployment
starts
preex6cum Number of months employed in the last 6 months before un-
employment starts
preex12cum Number of months employed in the last 12 months before
unemployment starts
preex24cum Number of months employed in the last 24 months before
unemployment starts
preex60cum Number of months employed in the last 60 months before
unemployment starts
pretxY Participation in any ALMP program reported in our data in
year(s) Y (Y=1, 2) before unemployment starts
Regional Information
LAND6 SchleswigHolstein/Hamburg
LAND7 Niedersachsen/Bremen
LAND8 NordrheinWestfalen
LAND9 Hessen
LAND10 RheinlandPfalz/Saarland
LAND11 BadenWürttemberg
LAND12 Bayern
Calendar Time of Entry into Unemployment
tnull First unemployment month (January 1960=0)
y19YY Unemployment begins in year 19YY
Interaction of Variables
south BadenWürttemberg/Bayern
middle Hessen/RheinlandPfalz/Saarland
north SchleswigHolstein/Hamburg/Niedersachsen/Bremen
BILXaXXYY Interactions between education category X and age between
XX and YY years
BILXBERY Interactions between education category X and occupation
category Y
yXXYY Sart of unemployment in year 19XX to 19YY
Notes: All variables except those referring to benet claims are dened at the time of entry into
unemployment and constant during the unemployment spell.
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Table 8: Estimated Coecients of the Propensity Scores for the
19801992 Sample
Participation Probit for ST8092, Males
Stratum 1 Stratum 2 Stratum 3
BER2 -0.201 (0.186) 0.123 (0.072)
BER3 0.229 (0.072)
BIL1BER2 0.114 (0.072) 0.365 (0.242)
BIL1BER3 0.636 (0.288)
BIL1a3034 0.341 (0.144)
BIL1a3544 -0.511 (0.252)
BIL2 0.429 (0.222)
BIL2BER3 -0.068 (0.192)
BIL2a3544 -0.416 (0.223)
BIL4 -0.188 (0.123)
LAND10 0.286 (0.086)
LAND8 0.169 (0.061)
LAND9 0.262 (0.084)
WZW1 0.235 (0.146)
WZW2 0.231 (0.098)
WZW3 0.301 (0.086) 0.177 (0.073)
WZW6 0.184 (0.080) 0.125 (0.060)
WZW7 0.121 (0.095)
a3044 0.161 (0.058)
a3544 0.520 (0.217)
a4553 -0.183 (0.076)
claim0 -0.002 (0.001)
claim0g0 -0.466 (0.353)
claim0g1 -0.479 (0.268)
claim0g2 -0.207 (0.130)
claim181 -0.001 (0.000)
entgcens -0.127 (0.179) -0.254 (0.234)
foreign -0.145 (0.085) -0.130 (0.083) -0.284 (0.090)
frmsize1 -0.310 (0.088) -0.025 (0.065)
frmsize2 -0.174 (0.078)
frmsize3 -0.049 (0.103) 0.122 (0.092)
kids -0.134 (0.077)
lnage -0.112 (0.126) 0.123 (0.133)
lnclaim361 -0.028 (0.014)
logentg -0.030 (0.023) 0.036 (0.030) -0.043 (0.040)
married -0.003 (0.069) -0.030 (0.062)
middle -0.012 (0.073) 0.147 (0.075)
north -0.151 (0.071) -0.184 (0.079)
preex12cum 0.019 (0.019) -0.043 (0.022)
preex24cum -0.019 (0.011) 0.001 (0.007) 0.018 (0.008)
preex60cum 0.001 (0.003) 0.003 (0.002)
preex6cum 0.036 (0.049)
south -0.147 (0.071) -0.182 (0.079)
tnull -0.001 (0.001)
y1982 -0.222 (0.094)
y1983 -0.265 (0.099)
y1987 -0.254 (0.114)
y1990 0.150 (0.104)
y1991 0.385 (0.196)
y8182 0.175 (0.069)
y8687 0.361 (0.060)
intercept -2.159 (0.405) -2.130 (0.507) -2.676 (0.533)
N 60083 25711 15814
<continued on next page>
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Table 8: Estimated Coecients of the Propensity Scores for the
19801992 Sample
Participation Probit for ST8092, Females
Stratum 1 Stratum 2 Stratum 3
BER2 0.024 (0.088)
BER3 0.163 (0.083)
BIL1 0.477 (0.172)
BIL2 0.443 (0.180)
BIL2a3034 -0.148 (0.150)
BIL2a3544 0.171 (0.086)
LAND11 -0.181 (0.110)
LAND8 0.187 (0.060)
WZW3 0.094 (0.085) -0.141 (0.114)
WZW6 0.029 (0.077)
WZW7 -0.170 (0.087)
a3034 0.322 (0.123)
a3544 0.123 (0.069) 0.124 (0.067)
claim0g1 0.578 (0.356)
claim0g2 0.861 (0.449)
claim0g3 0.825 (0.482)
claim181g0 0.933 (0.308)
claim181g1 0.772 (0.183)
claim181g2 0.573 (0.146)
claim_361 -0.219 (0.088)
entgcens 0.370 (0.298)
foreign -0.277 (0.121)
frmsize1 -0.119 (0.064) -0.180 (0.094)
frmsize2 -0.208 (0.090)
frmsize4 -0.046 (0.100)
kids -0.036 (0.081) 0.005 (0.084) 0.025 (0.087)
lnage 0.036 (0.140) -0.155 (0.150)
lnclaim0 -0.133 (0.080)
lnclaim181 0.050 (0.044)
logentg 0.087 (0.036) 0.088 (0.042) 0.045 (0.047)
married -0.128 (0.058) -0.125 (0.061) -0.150 (0.059)
middle 0.133 (0.080)
north 0.022 (0.076) -0.108 (0.075)
preex12 -0.111 (0.084) 0.276 (0.135)
preex12cum -0.061 (0.033)
preex24 0.174 (0.078)
preex24cum 0.005 (0.011)
preex6 -0.145 (0.082) 0.146 (0.189)
preex60cum 0.003 (0.003)
pretx2 0.317 (0.147)
south -0.265 (0.075)
tnull 0 (0.001) 0.002 (0.001) 0 (0.001)
y1984 -0.256 (0.130)
y1986 0.294 (0.084)
y1990 0.130 (0.117)
y1991 0.487 (0.178)
y8486 0.255 (0.069)
y8889 -0.245 (0.099) 0.275 (0.102)
intercept -3.572 (0.576) -3.530 (0.609) -2.336 (0.389)
N 35927 23115 17148
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Table 9: Results of Smith and Todd (2005) Balancing Test for the 19801992 Sample
ST8092, Males, Cubic of Pscore
P-values>.1 P-values>.05 P-values>.01 Regressors
Stratum 1 27 29 29 29
Stratum 2 22 23 24 24
Stratum 3 18 18 18 18
ST8092, Males, Quartic of Pscore
P-values>.1 P-values>.05 P-values>.01 Regressors
Stratum 1 22 26 29 29
Stratum 2 21 24 24 24
Stratum 3 15 18 18 18
ST8092, Females, Cubic of Pscore
P-values>.1 P-values>.05 P-values>.01 Regressors
Stratum 1 22 22 22 22
Stratum 2 20 20 20 20
Stratum 3 21 22 22 22
ST8092, Females, Quartic of Pscore
P-values>.1 P-values>.05 P-values>.01 Regressors
Stratum 1 17 19 21 22
Stratum 2 18 18 20 20
Stratum 3 20 22 22 22
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Table 10: Estimated Coecients for Test of Heterogeneity of Employment Eects
over Time (Men, Including LockIn Period)
Stratum 1 Stratum 2 Stratum 3
Year 1980a -.046 (.150) .164 (.212)
Year 1981 .020 (.131) -.114 (.075) .104 (.204)
Year 1982 .065 (.116) .045 (.104) .096 (.160)
Year 1983 .056 (.107) .196 (.105) .011 (.135)
Year 1984 .098 (.140) .084 (.102) .103 (.121)
Year 1985 .258 (.168) .121 (.090) .096 (.155)
Year 1986 .204 (.076) .029 (.087) .003 (.141)
Year 1987 .147 (.084) .122 (.099) .136 (.147)
Year 1988 .016 (.139) -.074 (.128) -.123 (.172)
Year 1989 .160 (.124) .169 (.122) .155 (.213)
Year 1990 -.015 (.134) .017 (.136) .107 (.179)
Year 1991 .065 (.261) -.041 (.129) -.052 (.150)
Year 1992 .217 (.168)
Month 1b -.135 (.092)
Month 2 -.119 (.091)
Month 3 -.066 (.094)
Month 4 -.058 (.105)
Month 6 .082 (.084)
Month 7 -.033 (.086)
Month 8 -.030 (.086)
Month 9 -.018 (.086)
Month 10 -.023 (.092)
Month 12 .017 (.142)
Month 13 -.018 (.142)
Month 14 -.182 (.159)
Month 15 -.105 (.150)
Month 16 -.043 (.141)
Month 17 .207 (.184)
Month 18 -.006 (.175)
Month 20 -.028 (.168)
Month 21 -.072 (.169)
Month 22 -.100 (.160)
Month 23 -.128 (.142)
Notes: Regression of the individual treatment eects averaged over the months following program
start on year dummies and elapsed unemployment duration at program start. Empirical standard
errors in parentheses are calculated from bootstrap resamples. Lockin period: until month six
since program start, end of the observation period: month 48 since program start. a `Year XXXX'
denotes the year of program start. b `Month Y' denotes the month of elapsed unemployment
duration at program start. Omitted categories: month 5 (stratum 1), month 11 (stratum 2),
month 19 (stratum 3).
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Table 11: Estimated Coecients for Test of Heterogeneity of Employment Eects
over Time (Women, Including LockIn Period)
Stratum 1 Stratum 2 Stratum 3
Year 1980a -.003 (.195)
Year 1981 .144 (.117) -.088 (.183) -.076 (.116)
Year 1982 .012 (.104) .058 (.143) -.020 (.166)
Year 1983 .132 (.119) -.001 (.118) .016 (.107)
Year 1984 .113 (.170) .276 (.192) .136 (.096)
Year 1985 .170 (.155) .144 (.166) .063 (.107)
Year 1986 .065 (.111) -.061 (.142) .090 (.091)
Year 1987 .051 (.103) .101 (.122) -.037 (.102)
Year 1988 .051 (.157) -.091 (.138) -.038 (.154)
Year 1989 .043 (.145) -.064 (.149) -.176 (.117)
Year 1990 .062 (.122) -.050 (.151) -.006 (.088)
Year 1991 .111 (.142) -.058 (.127) -.083 (.120)
Year 1992 -.148 (.153)
Month 1b -.045 (.129)
Month 2 -.112 (.097)
Month 3 -.041 (.100)
Month 5 -.095 (.098)
Month 6 -.020 (.122)
Month 7 .099 (.121)
Month 8 .205 (.131)
Month 9 -.077 (.129)
Month 10 -.009 (.145)
Month 12 -.040 (.100)
Month 13 .124 (.128)
Month 14 -.042 (.093)
Month 15 .228 (.137)
Month 16 .125 (.119)
Month 18 -.012 (.093)
Month 19 .100 (.141)
Month 20 .264 (.155)
Month 21 -.003 (.144)
Month 22 .270 (.109)
Month 23 -.043 (.086)
Notes: Regression of the individual treatment eects averaged over the months following program
start on year dummies and elapsed unemployment duration at program start. Empirical standard
errors in parentheses are calculated from bootstrap resamples. Lockin period: until month six
since program start, end of the observation period: month 48 since program start. a `Year XXXX'
denotes the year of program start. b `Month Y' denotes the month of elapsed unemployment
duration at program start. Omitted categories: month 4 (stratum 1), month 11 (stratum 2),
month 17 (stratum 3).
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Table 12: Estimated Coecients for Test of Heterogeneity of Employment Eects
over Time (Men, After LockIn Period)
Stratum 1 Stratum 2 Stratum 3
Year 1980a -.039 (.169) .188 (.229)
Year 1981 .035 (.145) -.118 (.082) .124 (.224)
Year 1982 .075 (.127) .046 (.111 ) .090 (.175)
Year 1983 .063 (.116) .235 (.115 ) .008 (.147)
Year 1984 .112 (.157) 097 (.111 ) .123 (.135)
Year 1985 .283 (.180) .128 (.096 ) .106 (.168)
Year 1986 .230 (.085) .039 (.096 ) .008 (.154)
Year 1987 .173 (.093) .132 (.111 ) .145 (.162)
Year 1988 .039 (.151) -.067 (.141) -.143 (.186)
Year 1989 .175 (.130) .195 (.134 ) .173 (.234)
Year 1990 -.010 (.148) .038 (.150 ) .120 (.196)
Year 1991 .074 (.276) -.043 (.142) -.072 (.166)
Year 1992 .237 (.187)
Month 1b -.146 (.101)
Month 2 -.115 (.101)
Month 3 -.081 (.104)
Month 4 -.048 (.116)
Month 6 .099 (.092)
Month 7 -.038 (.094)
Month 8 -.030 (.095)
Month 9 -.009 (.095)
Month 10 -.025 (.101)
Month 12 .026 (.155)
Month 13 -.008 (.155)
Month 14 -.201 (.173)
Month 15 -.108 (.165)
Month 16 -.045 (.154)
Month 17 .228 (.198)
Month 18 -.012 (.191)
Month 20 -.021 (.185)
Month 21 -.067 (.189)
Month 22 -.113 (.174)
Month 23 -.144 (.156)
Notes: Regression of the individual treatment eects averaged over the months following program
start on year dummies and elapsed unemployment duration at program start. Empirical standard
errors in parentheses are calculated from bootstrap resamples. Lockin period: until month six
since program start, end of the observation period: month 48 since program start. a `Year XXXX'
denotes the year of program start. b `Month Y' denotes the month of elapsed unemployment
duration at program start. Omitted categories: month 5 (stratum 1), month 11 (stratum 2),
month 19 (stratum 3).
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Table 13: Estimated Coecients for Test of Heterogeneity of Employment Eects
over Time (Women, After LockIn Period)
Stratum 1 Stratum 2 Stratum 3
Year 1980a .009 (.216)
Year 1981 .143 (.124) -.093 (.198) -.085 (.126)
Year 1982 .011 (.115) .055 (.156) -.030 (.183)
Year 1983 .146 (.128) .008 (.129) .021 (.118)
Year 1984 .130 (.183) .320 (.213) .146 (.107)
Year 1985 .185 (.169) .161 (.182) .076 (.119)
Year 1986 .079 (.120) -.065 (.156) .100 (.100)
Year 1987 .057 (.112) .116 (.135) -.046 (.109)
Year 1988 .024 (.168) -.093 (.153) -.030 (.174)
Year 1989 .055 (.160) -.068 (.165) -.184 (.128)
Year 1990 .079 (.131) -.053 (.165) -.010 (.099)
Year 1991 .130 (.153) -.044 (.139) -.088 (.129)
Year 1992 -.166 (.167)
Month 1b -.032 (.139)
Month 2 -.118 (.104)
Month 3 -.047 (.109)
Month 5 -.098 (.106)
Month 6 -.015 (.134)
Month 7 .116 (.134)
Month 8 .234 (.143)
Month 9 -.081 (.143)
Month 10 -.014 (.160)
Month 12 -.034 (.112)
Month 13 .133 (.141)
Month 14 -.046 (.102)
Month 15 .235 (.146)
Month 16 .136 (.127)
Month 18 -.021 (.103)
Month 19 .115 (.157)
Month 20 .285 (.174)
Month 21 .004 (.162)
Month 22 .295 (.122)
Month 23 -.054 (.093)
Notes: Regression of the individual treatment eects averaged over the months following program
start on year dummies and elapsed unemployment duration at program start. Empirical standard
errors in parentheses are calculated from bootstrap resamples. Lockin period: until month six
since program start, end of the observation period: month 48 since program start. a `Year XXXX'
denotes the year of program start. b `Month Y' denotes the month of elapsed unemployment
duration at program start. Omitted categories: month 4 (stratum 1), month 11 (stratum 2),
month 17 (stratum 3).
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Table 14: Estimated Coecients for Test of Heterogeneity of Employment Eects
over Time (Men, During LockIn Period)
Stratum 1 Stratum 2 Stratum 3
Year 1980a -.095 (.073) -.013 (.152)
Year 1981 -.088 (.095) -.080 (.056) -.040 (.133)
Year 1982 -.005 (.085) .037 (.088) .139 (.132)
Year 1983 .010 (.103) -.080 (.074) .032 (.109)
Year 1984 -.004 (.093) -.007 (.090) -.037 (.097)
Year 1985 .081 (.126) .073 (.085) .030 (.128)
Year 1986 .019 (.078) -.037 (.067) -.032 (.125)
Year 1987 -.040 (.082) .049 (.073) .069 (.117)
Year 1988 -.149 (.105) -.126 (.098) .018 (.132)
Year 1989 .056 (.146) -.015 (.094) .022 (.153)
Year 1990 -.054 (.120) -.136 (.088) .020 (.125)
Year 1991 -.003 (.192) -.025 (.095) .092 (.124)
Year 1992 .074 (.130)
Month 1b -.053 (.085)
Month 2 -.142 (.074)
Month 3 .039 (.081)
Month 4 -.136 (.075)
Month 6 -.038 (.074)
Month 7 .000 (.066)
Month 8 -.032 (.068)
Month 9 -.078 (.068)
Month 10 -.010 (.071)
Month 12 -.046 (.121)
Month 13 -.086 (.116)
Month 14 -.042 (.127)
Month 15 -.087 (.120)
Month 16 -.034 (.119)
Month 17 .057 (.151)
Month 18 .037 (.142)
Month 20 -.077 (.128)
Month 21 -.109 (.115)
Month 22 -.005 (.124)
Month 23 -.013 (.115)
Notes: Regression of the individual treatment eects averaged over the months following program
start on year dummies and elapsed unemployment duration at program start. Empirical standard
errors in parentheses are calculated from bootstrap resamples. Lockin period: until month six
since program start, end of the observation period: month 48 since program start. a `Year XXXX'
denotes the year of program start. b `Month Y' denotes the month of elapsed unemployment
duration at program start. Omitted categories: month 5 (stratum 1), month 11 (stratum 2),
month 19 (stratum 3).
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Table 15: Estimated Coecients for Test of Heterogeneity of Employment Eects
over Time (Women, During LockIn Period)
Stratum 1 Stratum 2 Stratum 3
Year 1980a -.095 (.091)
Year 1981 .147 (.104) -.051 (.127) -.015 (.097)
Year 1982 .017 (.089) .079 (.103) .055 (.138)
Year 1983 .032 (.091) -.061 (.076) -.018 (.092)
Year 1984 -.008 (.123) -.040 (.114) .060 (.090)
Year 1985 .057 (.130) .023 (.127) -.030 (.059)
Year 1986 -.039 (.080) -.032 (.091) .018 (.075)
Year 1987 .007 (.083) -.005 (.092) .023 (.094)
Year 1988 .243 (.140) -.078 (.081) -.097 (.083)
Year 1989 -.044 (.107) -.033 (.093) -.112 (.086)
Year 1990 -.062 (.087) -.027 (.093) .020 (.072)
Year 1991 -.029 (.124) -.161 (.104) -.051 (.102)
Year 1992 -.020 (.119)
Month 1b -.138 (.101)
Month 2 -.064 (.082)
Month 3 .001 (.082)
Month 5 -.072 (.079)
Month 6 -.058 (.078)
Month 7 -.022 (.088)
Month 8 -.006 (.093)
Month 9 -.056 (.095)
Month 10 .029 (.087)
Month 12 -.083 (.070)
Month 13 .057 (.101)
Month 14 -.014 (.080)
Month 15 .180 (.123)
Month 16 .045 (.097)
Month 18 .051 (.083)
Month 19 -.014 (.076)
Month 20 .118 (.132)
Month 21 -.053 (.069)
Month 22 .093 (.106)
Month 23 .036 (.090)
Notes: Regression of the individual treatment eects averaged over the months following program
start on year dummies and elapsed unemployment duration at program start. Empirical standard
errors in parentheses are calculated from bootstrap resamples. Lockin period: until month six
since program start, end of the observation period: month 48 since program start. a `Year XXXX'
denotes the year of program start. b `Month Y' denotes the month of elapsed unemployment
duration at program start. Omitted categories: month 4 (stratum 1), month 11 (stratum 2),
month 17 (stratum 3).
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Figure 1: Graphical Check of Common Support for QST00
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    Density of treated observations displayed on the upward ordinate.
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    Density of treated observations displayed on the upward ordinate.
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    Density of treated observations displayed on the upward ordinate.
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    Density of treated observations displayed on the upward ordinate.
QST00, Female=1, Stratum 3
Notes: QST00 refers to the qualication variant of shortterm training administered in the early
2000s.
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Figure 2: Graphical Check of Common Support for MST00
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    Density of treated observations displayed on the upward ordinate.
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    Density of treated observations displayed on the upward ordinate.
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    Density of treated observations displayed on the upward ordinate.
MST00, Female=1, Stratum 3
Notes: MST00 refers to the monitoring variant of shortterm training administered in the early
2000s.
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Figure 3: Graphical Check of Common Support for ST8092
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    Density of treated observations displayed on the upward ordinate.
ST8092, Female=0, Stratum 2
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    Density of treated observations displayed on the upward ordinate.
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    Density of treated observations displayed on the upward ordinate.
ST8092, Female=1, Stratum 3
Notes: ST8092 refers to shortterm training administered between 1980 and 1992.
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Figure 4: Elapsed Unemployment Duration at Start of ShortTerm Training in the
Early 2000s (ST00)
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Notes: Elapsed unemployment durations above 23 months are divided into two categories: The
rst bar shows the density of unemployment durations between 24 and 35 months, the second bar
refers to the density of unemployment durations larger than 35 months.
Figure 5: Elapsed Unemployment Duration at Start of ShortTerm Training Be-
tween 1980 and 1992 (ST8092)
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Notes: Elapsed unemployment durations above 23 months are divided into two categories: The
rst bar shows the density of unemployment durations between 24 and 35 months, the second bar
refers to the density of unemployment durations larger than 35 months.
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Figure 6: Percentiles of Cumulated Incidence of LongTerm Training for QST00
Participants and Matched Comparisons
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Notes: QST00 refers to the qualication variant of shortterm training administered in the
early 2000s. Cumulated incidence of longterm training calculated as the sum of the monthly
participation dummies from the beginning of unemployment until the end of the observation
period, i.e. over 36 months in the rst stratum, 30 months in the second, and 18 months in the
third.
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Figure 7: Percentiles of Cumulated Incidence of LongTerm Training for MST00
Participants and Matched Comparisons
0
6
12
18
24
30
36
Cu
m
ul
at
ed
 In
cid
en
ce
 o
f L
on
g−
Te
rm
 T
ra
in
in
g
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Percentile
Treatment Outcome
Counterfactual Outcome
MST00, Female=0, Stratum 1
0
6
12
18
24
30
36
Cu
m
ul
at
ed
 In
cid
en
ce
 o
f L
on
g−
Te
rm
 T
ra
in
in
g
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Percentile
Treatment Outcome
Counterfactual Outcome
MST00, Female=1, Stratum 1
0
6
12
18
24
30
36
Cu
m
ul
at
ed
 In
cid
en
ce
 o
f L
on
g−
Te
rm
 T
ra
in
in
g
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Percentile
Treatment Outcome
Counterfactual Outcome
MST00, Female=0, Stratum 2
0
6
12
18
24
30
36
Cu
m
ul
at
ed
 In
cid
en
ce
 o
f L
on
g−
Te
rm
 T
ra
in
in
g
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Percentile
Treatment Outcome
Counterfactual Outcome
MST00, Female=1, Stratum 2
0
6
12
18
24
30
36
Cu
m
ul
at
ed
 In
cid
en
ce
 o
f L
on
g−
Te
rm
 T
ra
in
in
g
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Percentile
Treatment Outcome
Counterfactual Outcome
MST00, Female=0, Stratum 3
0
6
12
18
24
30
36
Cu
m
ul
at
ed
 In
cid
en
ce
 o
f L
on
g−
Te
rm
 T
ra
in
in
g
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Percentile
Treatment Outcome
Counterfactual Outcome
MST00, Female=1, Stratum 3
Notes: MST00 refers to the monitoring variant of shortterm training administered in the early
2000s. Cumulated incidence of longterm training calculated as the sum of the monthly
participation dummies from the beginning of unemployment until the end of the observation
period, i.e. over 36 months in the rst stratum, 30 months in the second, and 18 months in the
third.
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Figure 8: Percentiles of Cumulated Incidence of LongTerm Training for ST8092
Participants and Matched Comparisons
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Notes: ST8092 refers to shortterm training administered between 1980 and 1992. Cumulated
incidence of longterm training calculated as the sum of the monthly participation dummies from
the beginning of unemployment until the end of the observation period, i.e. over 66 months in the
rst stratum, 60 months in the second, and 48 months in the third.
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Figure 9: Comparison of Average Treatment Eect on the Treated for QST00 on
Employment in Benchmark Specication to Reduced Specication
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Notes: QST00 refers to the qualication variant of shortterm training administered in the early
2000s. The reduced specication only considers the information in the more recent data that
is also available in the older data. Dierence in employment rates is measured on the ordinate,
pre-unemployment (< 0) and post-treatment ( 0) months on the abscissa. Lighter line and
dashed lines for 95%-condence intervals refer to the benchmark specication as shown in gure
1 of the paper. Bold line refers to the reduced propensity score specication.
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Figure 10: Comparison of Average Treatment Eect on the Treated for MST00 on
Employment in Benchmark Specication to Reduced Specication
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Notes: MST00 refers to the monitoring variant of shortterm training administered in the early
2000s. The reduced specication only considers the information in the more recent data that
is also available in the older data. Dierence in employment rates is measured on the ordinate,
pre-unemployment (< 0) and post-treatment ( 0) months on the abscissa. Lighter line and
dashed lines for 95%-condence intervals refer to the benchmark specication as shown in gure
2 of the paper. Bold line refers to the reduced propensity score specication.
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